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THE PROBLEMS OF PERMITTING EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The main advantage of the arbitration process is that it allows parties to 
settle their disputes without having to resort to courts.  Permitting parties to 
contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards would take away 
this advantage by allowing a party back into court for a “second bite at the 
apple.”  Generally, parties to an arbitration agreement are trying to avoid the 
costs and delays inherent in the court system.  These goals are abandoned by 
expanded judicial review.  A clause in an arbitration agreement expanding 
judicial review of awards would place the dispute into the litigation process, 
resulting in parties seeking efficient dispute resolution to “[a]bandon hope, all 
ye who enter here,”1 when faced with arbitration with expanded court review. 
Arbitration is defined by the Dictionary of Conflict Resolution as: 
[A] term for a range of dispute resolution processes involving the referral of a 
dispute to an impartial third party who, after giving the parties an opportunity 
to present their evidence and arguments renders a determination in settlement 
of the dispute . . . [and] is characterized as an informal, inexpensive, fast, and 
private adjudicative process that may consider custom as well as principles of 
fairness and equity to reach an outcome that is final and subject to very limited 
appeal.2 
Arbitration may be best described as a “creature of contract.”3  Parties in 
federal court, who have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, are 
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act4 (hereinafter referred to as the “FAA” 
or “Act”).  A valid and enforceable arbitration agreement has the effect of 
“oust[ing]” a court of its jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.5  Arbitration, as a 
 
* This Comment, by Kevin A. Sullivan, was selected as the Best Student Work to appear in 
Volume 46 of the Saint Louis University Law Journal.  
 1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 5 (Lawrence Grant White trans., Pantheon 
Books 1948). 
 2. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28, 33 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999). 
 3. U.S. Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan J., 
concurring). 
 4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). 
 5. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 987 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
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whole, is an important function of the law at the turn of the second millennium 
as more and more parties agree to arbitrate in areas such as general commercial 
disputes, employment disputes, securities laws and even consumer purchases, 
to name just a few. 
In June 2001, a split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
developed over the issue of whether parties to an arbitration agreement could 
agree to federal court appellate review of an arbitration award in federal court 
beyond the level of review Congress set forth in the FAA.6  A clause 
expanding judicial review of an award may be as simple as giving either party 
the right to appeal an award in district court “on the grounds that the award is 
not supported by the evidence,”7 may provide for de novo review for “errors or 
law,”8 or may do both and set out the specific scope of review.9  The Tenth 
Circuit held parties are not permitted to expand the scope of review beyond the 
tenets of the Act.10  This position departs from that of the Fourth, Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits, which have held that parties can contract for expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards.11  This conflict between the Circuits centers on 
two countervailing policies: on the one hand, the FAA’s guarantee of 
enforcement of arbitration agreements by the courts according to the terms of 
the parties’ agreement12 and, on the other hand, the policy that parties cannot, 
by contract, alter the way that the courts review arbitration awards.13 
This Comment will explore the courts’ reasoning in endorsing or rejecting 
the expanded review of arbitration awards and will ultimately conclude that 
parties should not be permitted to expand judicial review of arbitration awards 
beyond the grounds for vacating or modifying awards under the FAA.14  Part II 
will describe how the Act operates and the reasons behind its enactment.  
Special attention will be given to the grounds for vacating or modifying 
awards.  Part III will provide an overview of pertinent Supreme Court cases 
dealing with aspects of the FAA with an eye towards how the Supreme Court 
might rule on the issue of expanded judicial review of arbitration awards.  Part 
IV is divided into two subparts.  Subpart A will examine the evolution of the 
courts allowing expanded judicial review through an analysis of In re Fils Et 
 
 6. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001); LaPine Tech. 
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 7. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930. 
 8. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 9. For examples of possible clauses permitting expanded judicial review of awards, see 
Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error—An Option to Consider, 
Appendix B, Other Provisions Permitting Appellate Review of Arbitration Awards, 13 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 124 (1997). 
 10. Bowen, 254 F.3d 925. 
 11. See, e.g., Gateway, 64 F.3d 993; LaPine, 130 F.3d 884. 
 12. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888. 
 13. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933. 
 14. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994). 
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Cables D’Acier de Lens,15 Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI 
Telecommunications Corp.,16 Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland17 and 
LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.18  Subpart B will analyze Bowen v. 
Amoco Pipeline Co.19 and the opinions upon which the Bowen court relied in 
rejecting expanded judicial review.20  Part V presents an argument for rejecting 
party-created expansion of judicial review on two grounds: first, that expansion 
of judicial review will threaten the integrity of the arbitration process because 
the additional costs and delays inherent in the court system will lead to 
arbitration becoming just another rung on the ladder of federal court litigation 
and, second, that parties cannot alter the process of federal court adjudication 
solely by their agreement and without express Congressional assent.  Part VI 
will conclude with an overview of the arguments against expansion of judicial 
review and give some alternatives to purely accepting or rejecting expanded 
judicial review. 
II.  THE FAA AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The primary aim of the enactment of the FAA in 1925 was to “overcome 
courts’ refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”21  The legislative history of 
the Act focuses on two benefits derived from it: the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements and the desirability of arbitration.  According to the 
House Judiciary Committee Report, the Act was to “declare[] simply that such 
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the 
Federal courts for their enforcement.”22  Congressman Graham expressed the 
opinion that the proposed bill neither created new legislation nor granted new 
rights, but provided a remedy for parties to enforce “that which they have 
already agreed to.”23  Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, sent a 
letter to the judiciary committees urging that the Act was needed due to the 
 
 15. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (endorsing, for the first time, expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards pursuant to the parties’ agreement).  See Part IV.A.1 infra for a full 
discussion of the case. 
 16. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).  See infra Part IV.A.2 for a full discussion of the case. 
 17. 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished 
table case).  See infra Part IV.A.3 for a full discussion of the case. 
 18. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).  See infra Part IV.A.4 for a full discussion of the case. 
 19. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).  See infra Part IV.B.1 for a full discussion of the case. 
 20. See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 
(7th Cir. 1991); UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).  See 
infra Part IV.B.2 for a full discussion of these cases. 
 21. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1-2 (1924), reprinted in IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION LAW 98 (1992). 
 23. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924), reprinted in MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 98. 
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“clogging of our courts.”24  Congressman Dyer felt the Act would “do away 
with a lot of expensive litigation.”25  The House Committee Report further 
stated that the “costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely eliminated 
by agreements for arbitration, if [such] agreements are made valid and 
enforceable.”26  Amazingly, because of the courts’ hostility towards 
arbitration, there was no opposition to the proposed FAA.27  In fact, the Act 
and its amendments passed easily in both Houses of Congress and were signed 
into law by President Coolidge on February 12, 1925.28 
As to any legislative history available to shed light on the drafters’ intent 
regarding judicial review of awards, there is none.  Professor Sarah Cole has 
posited that the drafters of the FAA did not think “parties would ever be 
interested in expanding judicial review of arbitration awards.”29  Professor 
Cole found that the lack of a discussion in the legislative history of judicial 
review meant Congress “intended to codify the common law, which limited 
review to examination of the arbitral award for procedural irregularities.”30 
A. Application of the FAA 
The FAA sections discussed in this Part of the Comment will give a brief 
overview of how the Act operates and how difficult it is for a party to gain 
vacatur or modification under the FAA.  The main focus, however, will be on 
section 10, wherein Congress gave the grounds for vacating an arbitration 
award.31 
Section 2 of the FAA provides that a “written provision” or “an agreement 
in writing” to settle a dispute arising out of a contract or “transaction . . . shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”32  For example, an arbitration 
 
 24. Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of 
Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime transactions, or Commerce Among the States or 
Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S.1005 and H.R. 646 Before the 
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th  Cong. 21 (1924), reprinted in MACNEIL, 
supra note 22, at 92. 
 25. 65 CONG. REC. H11081 (1924), reprinted in MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 101.  In Wilko 
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953), the Supreme Court found that the Congressional reports on 
the FAA “stress the need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation . . . .” 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 2 (1924), reprinted in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 220 (1985). 
 27. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 115 (1992). 
 28. Id. at 101. 
 29. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party 
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1255 (2000). 
 30. Id. 
 31. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). 
 32. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the 
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agreement is void and unenforceable if there is a lack of “mutual obligation to 
arbitrate.”33  Section 2 has been held to be “a congressional declaration of a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” creating  “a body of 
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement 
within the coverage of the Act.”34  Therefore, a party must satisfy section 2 if it 
hopes to compel arbitration or to confirm, vacate or modify an award. 
If one party has already filed an action in a federal district court, section 3 
of the FAA permits a party seeking arbitration to apply for a stay of the action 
in the court until arbitration is completed pursuant to the parties’ agreement.35  
The district court must simply be “satisfied that the issue involved in such suit 
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement . . . .”36  In 
effect, the granting of the stay takes the dispute out of the hands of the court 
and places it into the hands of an arbitrator.37 
Section 4 of the FAA sets forth the procedural requirements a party must 
meet to have a federal district court compel arbitration.38  If one party fails or 
refuses to arbitrate, the aggrieved party can petition any district court having 
jurisdiction (through either diversity or federal question), unless a court is 
agreed upon on in the arbitration agreement, for an order directing the non-
complying party to submit to arbitration.39  At this stage, the non-complying 
party has the opportunity to prove that the arbitration agreement is not valid or 
 
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that 
would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 
 33. Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985).  The Eleventh Circuit held 
“that the consideration exchanged for one party’s promise to arbitrate must be the other party’s 
promise to arbitrate at least some specified class of claims.  Mere presence of an arbitration clause 
is insufficient to enforce the arbitration agreement.”  Id. at 1550. 
 34. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  The 
Court further stated: “The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the 
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, 
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”  Id. at 24-5.  Moses H. Cone is discussed further infra 
Part III. 
 35. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).  See Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, 713 
F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1983).  In Contracting Northwest, the Eighth Circuit held that “the district 
court [has] the inherent power to grant the stay in order to control its docket, conserve judicial 
resources, and provide for a just determination of the cases pending before it . . . .”  Id. at 387 
(citing Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Vecco Concrete Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 961, 964 (4th Cir. 
1980)). 
 36. § 3. 
 37. However, the dispute can easily be brought back into the district court after the 
arbitration is completed if the party prevailing at arbitration seeks confirmation of the award, if 
the losing party seeks vacatur of the award or if either party seeks modification or correction of 
the award.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1994).  Each of these sections will be discussed infra Part II.B. 
 38. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). 
 39. See id. 
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that it is not in default of the agreement and can even request that a jury decide 
the issue.40  If the court, or jury if one is demanded, finds that the agreement to 
arbitrate is valid, the court will order an arbitration to proceed “in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement.”41  In interpreting an arbitration agreement, 
“due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration” and any 
ambiguities in the arbitration clause are to be “resolved in favor of 
arbitration.”42  The FAA requires the compelling of arbitration, even if the 
result would be an “inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in 
different forums.”43 
Section 5 of the Act allows a party, in the absence of a method for 
choosing an arbitrator in the parties’ agreement or if the parties fail to name an 
arbitrator, to apply to a court for the naming of an arbitrator.44  Unless stated 
otherwise in the parties’ agreement, a single arbitrator will preside over the 
arbitration.45 
Section 9 of the Act states that a party, upon a final entry of an arbitration 
award, may petition a district court to enter judgment on the award within one 
year of the date of the award.46  This confirmation mechanism operates only if 
the parties have expressly stated in their agreement that a judgment is to be 
entered on the arbitrator’s award.47  The court must confirm the award and 
enter judgment on it “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as 
proscribed in sections 10 and 11 of [the Act].”48  A straight-forward 
interpretation of the language in section 9 leads to the conclusion that a party 
opposing confirmation of an award must challenge the award through the 
machinery for vacatur, modification or correction as provided in sections 10 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 
(1989). 
 43. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).  In Byrd, the Supreme 
Court rejected the approach taken by the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits when faced with the 
situation in which a party seeks to compel arbitration of a pendent state law claim, while a federal 
court would still have jurisdiction over a federal law claim.  Id. at 216.  These Circuits held that 
federal district courts could use discretion in “deny[ing] arbitration as to the arbitration claims 
and try all the claims together in federal court” if the “arbitrable [state] and nonarbitrable [federal] 
claims arise out the same transaction, and are sufficiently intertwined factually and legally.”  Id. 
at 216-17.  The Byrd Court reversed the decision of the district court and court of appeals that 
applied this doctrine in refusing to compel arbitration of the pendent state claims.  Id. at 223-24. 
 44. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).  See Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (“[A] district court is without authority to review the validity of arbitrators’ rulings 
prior to the making of an award.  Where . . . arbitrators make an interim ruling that does not 
purport to resolve finally the issues submitted to them, judicial review is unavailable.”). 
 47. § 9. 
 48. Id.  The confirmation can be entered in a court specified by the parties.  Id. 
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and 11 of the FAA.  Courts have varying interpretations about how parties can 
invoke section 9, the main issue being whether express language is needed or if 
the agreement for confirmation can be implied by a “final and binding” term.49 
Section 11 of the Act allows an aggrieved party to apply to the district 
court in the district where the arbitration award was granted for an order 
modifying or correcting the award to “promote justice between the parties.”50  
As with section 10, the grounds for modification or correction are very limited 
in scope.51  The first ground is where an arbitrator miscalculates figures in the 
award or makes a material mistake in describing “any person, thing, or 
property referred to in the award.”52  One example of an arbitrator’s 
miscalculation leading to court modification is where “an arbitration award 
orders a party to pay damages that have already been paid or which are 
included elsewhere in the award . . . .”53  The second and third grounds are 
where the arbitrator makes an award on “a matter not submitted to them” or the 
arbitrator’s “award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy.”54  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has warned that “[§] 
11 . . . is limited . . . [and] does not license the district court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the arbitrators.”55 
Section 16 of the FAA is a catchall authorizing parties to appeal a court 
order regarding refusal of a stay (§ 3), denying a petition to compel (§ 4), and 
confirming (or refusing to confirm) (§ 9), modifying (§ 11), or vacating (§ 10) 
an award.56  Section 16 prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order 
 
 49. Erika Van Ausdall, Confirmation of Arbitral Awards: The Confusion Surrounding 
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 41, 47-48 (2000). 
 50. 9 U.S.C. §11 (1994). 
 51. Section 10 of the Act is discussed infra Part II.B. 
 52. § 11(a). 
 53. Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994).  In Eljer Mfg., 
two corporations entered into joint venture requiring a $2,500,000 loan for which each entity 
guaranteed $1,250,000.  Id. at 1252.  After the joint venture failed and arbitration ensued, the 
arbitrator included in his award to the prevailing party the entire amount of the loan ($2,500,000) 
even though the losing party had already repaid the loan to the bank.  Id. at 1253.  The entire 
amount of the loan was included again in the award to calculate the amount the losing party had 
been unjustly enriched.  Id. 
 54. § 11(b)-(c).  However, the award will not be modified if “it is a matter not affecting the 
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.”  Id. § 11(b). 
 55. Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980).  The dispute 
in Diapulse arose out of  a distributor agreement between American and Swiss companies.  Id. at 
1109.  The American company demanded arbitration alleging that the Swiss company violated a 
non-compete clause in the agreement.  Id.  The arbitration award enjoined the Swiss company 
from competing with the American company, but the district court found that the award violated 
public policy in restraining trade and modified the award by limiting the injunction in time and 
geographic area.  Id. at 1110.  The Second Circuit held that the district court erred by modifying 
the award in this manner.  Id. 
 56. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). 
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granting a stay, compelling arbitration or “refusing to enjoin an arbitration that 
is subject to this title.”57 
B. Statutory Grounds for Vacating Arbitration Awards58 
In essence, expanded judicial review of an award is a license for a court to 
vacate or modify an award pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement.  
The traditional forms of vacatur are found in the FAA.59  Additionally, there 
exist several grounds outside of the Act created by the judiciary.  Section 10 of 
the FAA is at the heart of the controversy over whether parties may 
contractually expand federal judicial review of arbitration awards.  A party to 
the arbitration can apply to the court “in and for the district wherein the award 
was made” for an order vacating the award on four separate grounds.60  Where 
an arbitration award is vacated on these grounds, the court has the option to 
remand the matter to an arbitrator for rehearing.61 
The first ground is “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means.”62  Vacatur on this ground is difficult to obtain.  For example, to 
vacate an award due to fraud, the challenging party must show that due 
diligence prior to the arbitration would not have uncovered the fraud, that the 
fraud was a material issue, and establish by “clear and convincing evidence” 
that there was a fraud.63 
The second ground is “evident partiality or corruption” on the part of an 
arbitrator.64  One example of the application of this ground is a Supreme Court 
decision which held that an arbitrator’s failure to disclose to a party that he had 
a long financial relationship with the opposing party was “‘evident partiality’” 
or even “‘undue means’” and ordered vacatur.65  Another example of “evident 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996), for an in-depth discussion of the 
grounds for vacating a commercial arbitration award. 
 59. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). 
 60. Id. § 10(a). 
 61. Id. § 10(a)(5). 
 62. Id. § 10(a)(1). 
 63. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam).  In McCollough, the district court rejected the investors’ claim that the award was the 
result of a fraud because the brokerage firm raised “meritless defenses,” which knowingly 
misstated the law.  Id. at 1402, 1404.  See also Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(“The party asserting fraud must establish it by clear and convincing evidence . . . and must show 
that due diligence could not have resulted in discovery of the fraud prior to arbitration.”). 
 64. Id. § 10(a)(2). 
 65. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).  In 
Commonwealth Coatings, the arbitrator who was found to be evidently partial was an engineering 
consultant who had rendered services to one of the parties over four or five years and been paid 
$12,000 over that period.  Id. at 146.  See also Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council 
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partiality” was found in a case where the arbitrator reduced the loss 
documented by one party by ninety-five percent without any basis for the 
reduction in the facts.66 
The third ground for vacatur under section 10 of the Act is where the 
arbitrators are guilty of “misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing . . . or 
in refusing to hear” pertinent and material evidence or “any other misbehavior” 
resulting in a party’s rights being prejudiced.67  An award may only be 
overturned if an arbitrator suppressed evidence that was decisive in light of the 
case or which resulted in serious harm, not merely if the suppression was an 
error of law.68  One illustration of arbitrator misconduct is when an arbitrator 
refused to adjourn a hearing because of the sudden illness of a key 
representative of a party.69  Professor Stephen Hayford has stated that “in 
absence of substantial, direct proof that one or more of the types of misconduct 
addressed in [the first three grounds] has transpired, coupled with a 
 
Carpenters Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that “evident partiality” was 
present where the arbitrator was the son of a vice president of the union which was a party in the 
dispute).  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit refined the “evident partiality” standard in hopes of 
avoiding an expansive application of it, by stating: 
  [W]e read Section [10(a)(2)] as requiring . . . more than the mere “appearance of 
bias” to vacate an arbitration award. . . .  [W]e hold that “evident partiality” within the 
meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reasonable person would have to 
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration. 
Id. at 83-84. 
 66. Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 658 F. Supp. 576, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The 
Court . . . is unable to infer a ground for arbitrators’ decision from the facts of this case. . . . 
Under these circumstances, reduction of the amount of the award by ninety-five percent can only 
represent ‘evident partiality’ on the part of the arbitrators towards Merrill Lynch.”). 
 67. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1994). 
 68. Newark Stereotypers’ Union v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 
1968).  The union, in Newark Stereotypers’ Union, sought vacatur because the arbitrators refused 
to consider evidence that its expert witness had been intimidated into not testifying by the other 
party.  Id. at 596.  The district court refused vacatur of the award and the appellate court affirmed 
because the union’s claim of intimidation “was peripheral to the issue of fact which was before 
the arbitrators for decision.”  Id. at 600.  See also Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. The 
Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that “an award will not be 
vacated even though the arbitrator may have made, in the eyes of judges, errors of fact and law 
unless it ‘compels the violation of law or conduct contrary to public policy’”) (quoting Gulf 
States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 69. Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local 1115 Joint Board, 377 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-13 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).  In Allendale Nursing Home, the arbitrator refused to adjourn the proceeding 
after an employer’s representative became visibly ill at the arbitration, raising even the 
arbitrator’s concern, and requiring her to be hospitalized.  Id. at 1212. The district court vacated 
the award and remanded the dispute to arbitration because it found the arbitrator’s refusal to be an 
abuse of discretion when the representative was important to the employer’s case.  Id. at 1214. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
518 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:509 
demonstrated link between that untoward behavior and the challenged arbitral 
result, the prospects for vacatur of the arbitration award are doubtful.”70 
The fourth ground for vacatur is “[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that” a true award on the matter 
submitted “was not made.”71  An example of a situation where a court will 
vacate an award due to arbitrators exceeding their authority is when the award 
included punitive damages when the parties’ agreement did not permit the 
awarding of them.72  Another example is where an arbitrator exceeds his 
authority by deciding issues and rights of parties not submitted to him by the 
parties.73  Courts have rejected several grounds for vacatur lying outside of the 
FAA simply because they were not specifically included in the Act, 
particularly: lack of proper notice of the arbitration,74 the failure of an 
arbitrator to explain the reasoning of an award75 or an arbitrator’s faulty fact-
finding or errors of law.76  Courts will also not allow a party to collaterally 
 
 70. Hayford, supra note 58, at 749. 
 71. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
 72. See Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since 
the arbitrators were not entitled to award punitive damages due to the choice-of-law provision in 
the parties’ Agreement, it is manifest that the Panel exceeded its authority in awarding punitive 
damages.”). 
 73. See  NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co, Inc., 43 F.3d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1995).  In NCR, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed vacatur of an award that awarded punitive damages not just to the dealer who 
brought the claim, but to all of the manufacturer’s dealers throughout the country.  Id. at 1078.  
The court held “the arbitrator exceeded his authority by resolving a dispute which may or may not 
have existed between [the manufacturer] and its other nonservicing dealers, and by determining 
the rights of individuals who were not parties in the arbitration proceedings.”  Id. at 1080. 
 74. See Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have repeatedly 
held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides the exclusive grounds for setting aside an arbitration award 
under the FAA.  Inadequate notice is not one of these grounds, and the [challenging party’s] 
claim therefore fails.”). 
 75. See In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1211, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972) (“We hold that in the 
circumstances of this case the arbitrators have no such obligation to explain their award. . . .  
[F]orcing arbitrators to explain their award even when grounds for it can be gleaned from the 
record will unjustifiably diminish whatever efficiency [arbitration] now achieves.”).  See also 
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986).  In Stroh Container, the 
award contained a discussion of the issues, but the arbitrators did not outline the laws they used 
nor did they describe their reasoning or analysis.  Id. at 750.  In affirming the district court’s 
refusal to vacate, the Eighth Circuit held: “Arbitrators are not required to elaborate their reasoning 
supporting an award . . . and to allow a court to conclude that it may substitute its own judgment 
for the arbitrator’s whenever the arbitrator chooses not to explain the award would improperly 
subvert the proper functioning of the arbitral process. . . . “  Id. 
 76. See Office of Supply Gov’t of the Republic of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 
377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (“An award will not be set aside because of an error on the part of the 
arbitrators in their interpretation of the law.”). See also San Martine Compania de Navegacion, 
S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he statutory grounds 
for vacating or modifying the award of arbitrators are stated in [§§ 10 and 11 of the FAA] and 
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attack an arbitration award by filing a separate lawsuit or seeking another 
arbitration, leaving the grounds for the challenging an award firmly within 
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.77 
Numerous courts have acknowledged that the review of arbitration awards 
are extremely limited and “among the narrowest known to the law.”78  An 
arbitration award is not subject to review except for the grounds set out in 
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA and the deference to these awards almost 
approach the deference “given to a jury decision.”79 
C. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacating Awards 
Several federal circuit courts have created further grounds for vacating 
arbitration awards beyond section 10 of the FAA. These include the manifest 
disregard of the law standard, the “completely irrational” or “arbitrary and 
 
neither section authorizes the setting aside of an award ‘on grounds of erroneous finding of fact or 
misinterpretation of law.’”). 
 77. See, e.g., Decker v. Merrill Lynch, 205 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2000).  In Decker, an 
aggrieved investor who lost at arbitration filed a lawsuit and a second claim for arbitration 
alleging that the brokerage firm “improperly interfered with the arbitration.”  Id. at 907.  The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit and the injunction against arbitration finding 
that the investor’s “claims collaterally attack the arbitration award and the FAA provides the 
exclusive remedy for challenging acts that taint an arbitration award.”  Id. at 908.  See also Corey 
v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) (“To allow a collateral attack 
against arbitrators and their judgments would also emasculate the appeal provisions of the 
[FAA].”). 
 78. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting ARW 
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1995)); Richmond, Fredricksburg & 
Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Communications Int’l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978)).  See also First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding that courts should set aside arbitrator 
awards only in the narrow circumstances of § 10); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs., 
Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The grounds on which the plaintiffs can attack the 
award are limited to those set forth in the [FAA].”); Bavarati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 
F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The grounds for setting aside arbitration awards are exhaustively 
stated in the [FAA].”); Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267 
(7th Cir. 1988) (“Sections 10 and 11 of the Act set forth the exclusive grounds for vacating or 
modifying a commercial arbitration award.”); John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Sys., Inc., 623 
F.2d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1980) (courts generally refuse to second guess arbitration awards and 
accord “the narrowest of reading to [the Act’s] authorization to vacate awards”); Gingiss Int’l, 
Inc., 58 F.3d at 332 (FAA § 10(a) gives the exclusive grounds for vacating an award); Barbier v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 120 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“It is well settled that judicial 
review of an arbitration award is narrowly limited.”); Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 41-42 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (“The [FAA] provides the exclusive remedy for challenging conduct that taints an 
arbitration award within the Act’s coverage.”). 
 79. 2 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 16-21 
(3d ed. 1999).  But see Corey, 691 F.2d at 1209 (“We believe that determinations made by the 
panel of arbitrators in the case on appeal are functionally comparable to those of a judge or an 
agency hearing examiner . . . .”). 
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capricious” award standard, the public policy standard and the essence of the 
contract test.  Yet, these judicially created grounds rarely result in parties being 
successful in persuading a court to vacate an arbitration award.80 
The manifest disregard of the law standard comes from dicta in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan.81  This standard has several 
definitions,82 but the easiest to comprehend seems to be that the arbitrator had 
knowledge of the applicable law, but decided to ignore it.83  The standard 
considers the mental state of the arbitrator, not the magnitude or consequence 
of the arbitrator error.84  This ground for vacatur “clearly means more than 
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.”85  The manifest disregard 
standard has been both praised86 and heavily criticized as a source of 
confusion87 and as being impossible to prove.88 
The “completely irrational” or “arbitrary and capricious” standard calls for 
vacating arbitration awards that are “unsupported in the record.”89  This 
standard is applicable to findings of fact and does not allow a reviewing court 
to replace the arbitrator’s judgment with its own.90  The “completely irrational” 
standard centers on the “magnitude and quality of the error,” but can only be 
invoked if an arbitrator explains her award.91 
Like the manifest disregard standard, the public policy standard for 
vacating arbitration awards has no black letter definition.  Generally, courts 
will vacate awards that are detrimental to public interests such as health or 
safety, awards that enforce rights in an illegal contract or that require 
 
 80. Rachel C. Corn, Recent Development, LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 13 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1085, 1086 (1998). 
 81. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (“In unrestricted submission, . . . the interpretations of the 
law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to 
judicial review for error in interpretation.”). 
 82. See Marcus Mungioli, Comment, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A 
Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1079, 1097-1102 
(2000). 
 83. Gerald F. Rath & Richelle S. Kennedy, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 1062 
PLI/Corp. 513, 523-24 (1998). 
 84. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 100 (1997).  The manifest disregard ground for vacatur 
is different than bias in that the arbitrator need not favor or show malice towards one party, she 
only needs to disregard the law in an unacceptable manner. 
 85. 1 GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 33.08, at 24 (rev. ed. 
2001). 
 86. See generally Mungioli, supra note 82. 
 87. See Adam Milam, Comment, A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards for 
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705 (1999). 
 88. Davis, supra note 84, at 94. 
 89. Id. at 102. 
 90. Id. at 103. 
 91. Id. at 107. 
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performing an illegal act, and awards that grant relief reserved to the courts 
such as punitive damages.92  Vacating an award under the public policy 
standard demands more than an error or misconstruction of the law by the 
arbitrator.93  A good example of an arbitration award that violates public policy 
would be one that reinstates an employee who was discharged for sexually 
harassing a customer’s employee without the arbitrator investigating the 
alleged sexual harassment.94 
The essence of the contract test focuses on whether the arbitrator, in her 
interpretation of the contract, ignored the parties’ intent as set forth in the 
arbitration agreement.95  It is argued that placing the intent of the parties above 
“finality and efficiency harmonizes with the legislative intent behind the 
FAA.”96  However, it is difficult to see how much this standard truly departs 
from the statutory ground set forth in section 10(a)(4) of the Act.97  The 
essence of the contract standard, along with the completely irrational standard, 
have been criticized both for rarely being effective in vacating an award and in 
the way the courts define the standards in a vague and complex manner.98 
Nonetheless, the party asserting the judicially created ground for vacating 
an award has “a staggeringly heavy burden” in showing justification for 
vacatur and courts have interpreted these grounds narrowly and have applied 
them sparingly.99  It should always be remembered that “[t]he conventional 
wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration awards [under any standard, 
whether created by courts or the legislature,] are rare.”100 
III.  SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE ACT 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on whether parties 
may contractually expand judicial review beyond the grounds set forth in 
section 10 of the FAA.  Even before the Circuit split over this issue occurred, 
 
 92. Id. at 109. 
 93. See Hayford, supra note 58, at 782. 
 94. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 
1438 (3d Cir. 1992).  In Stroehmann, the arbitrator refused to investigate the alleged harassment 
and, instead, found that the employer had not investigated the incident sufficiently to warrant a 
firing for just cause.  Id. at 1440.  The district court vacated the reinstatement award and 
remanded the case to a different arbitrator.  The Court of Appeals agreed holding “an arbitrator’s 
award reinstating an employee accused of sexual harassment without a determination regarding 
the merits of the allegation violates well-established and dominant public policies concerning 
sexual harassment in the workplace.”  Id. at 1438. 
 95. See Hayford, supra note 58, at 795. 
 96. Davis, supra note 84, at 126. 
 97. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of § 10(a)(4). 
 98. See Hayford, supra note 58, at 823. 
 99. See Rath & Kennedy, supra note 83, at 523. 
 100. JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
624 (2d ed. 1996). 
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two commentators thought that, barring a Congressional amendment of the 
Act, the Supreme Court might need to resolve the issue.101  This Comment will 
look to several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA for guidance on 
how the Court might resolve the Circuit split over expanded judicial review of 
arbitration awards. 
A. Cases Interpreting Section 4 of the FAA 
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court 
dealt with the issue of whether a court or an arbitrator should resolve a claim of 
“fraud in the inducement” of an agreement covered by the FAA when the 
arbitration agreement was silent on the issue.102The Court held that, under 
section 4 of the FAA, a federal court could adjudicate the issue of whether 
there was fraud involved the “making” of the arbitration clause, but that it 
could not, under the FAA, “consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the 
contract generally.”103  In finding that a court could only consider a contract if 
the arbitration clause was induced by fraud, the Court honored “the 
unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when 
selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and 
obstruction in the courts.”104 
This decision in Prima Paint is important with respect to expanded judicial 
review because the Supreme Court acknowledged that once parties agree to 
arbitrate they should be free from the “delay and obstruction” of the courts.105  
Courts in favor of enforcing agreements that expand the review of arbitration 
awards may be ignoring the “unmistakably clear congressional purpose” that 
arbitration should be a quick and efficient form of dispute resolution because 
these courts are reviewing arbitration awards beyond what is set forth in the 
FAA.  Therefore, these courts would be reviewing awards not intended by 
Congress to be reviewed and prolonging the final resolution of the parties’ 
dispute.  Finally, the Prima Paint Court stated: 
the question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to 
conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly 
has power to legislate.  The answer to that can only be in the affirmative.  And 
it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and 
 
 101. See Laird E. Lawrence & Christopher R. Ward, The Availability and Scope of Appeal of 
Arbitration Awards Under the Federal, Uniform, and State Acts, THE BRIEF, Spring 2000, at 36. 
 102. 388 U.S. 395, 396-97 (1967).  In Prima Paint, the dispute arose out of a consulting 
agreement (and later purchase agreement) signed by the two parties.  Id. at 397.  Prima Paint 
claimed that Flood & Conklin had induced its assent to the consulting agreement by representing 
that it was solvent, while, in truth, Flood & Conklin was planning on filing for bankruptcy.  Id. at 
398. 
 103. Id. at 403-04. 
 104. Id. at 404. 
 105. Prime Paint, 388 U.S. at 404. 
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confined to the incontestable federal foundations of “control over interstate 
commerce and over admiralty.”106 
By applying this corollary to the issue in this Comment, the unavoidable 
conclusion is that individuals do not have this plenary power to direct courts 
how to act in cases under the FAA, since the Act is a regulation of commerce 
and individuals, obviously, are not granted the same power to regulate 
commerce in the Constitution as Congress is.107  The power to control the 
jurisdiction of federal courts is Congress’ alone, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Sheldon v. Sill, by stating that: 
Congress, having the power to establish the courts, must define their respective 
jurisdictions. . . . Congress may withhold from any court of its creation 
jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies [in Article III of the 
Constitution].  Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as 
the statute confers.108 
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., the 
Court answered the question of whether a district court properly stayed an 
action to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA pending resolution of 
state court action involving the issue of arbitrability.109  The Supreme Court 
held the district court’s staying of the action “was plainly erroneous” because 
of the clear Congressional intent in the FAA to move a dispute out of litigation 
 
 106. Id. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. REP. NO. 536, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924)).  See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1995) (“The FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts 
that involve interstate commerce . . . and in maritime transactions, including bills of lading . . . 
where there is no independent basis in law or equity for revocation. . . .”).  The Supreme Court 
has similarly explained that in the area of admiralty and maritime law Congress has broad 
powers, much like Congress’ Commerce powers: 
  After the Constitution went into effect, the substantive law theretofore in force was 
not regarded as superceded or as being only the law of the several states, but as having 
become the law of the United States—subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or 
supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require.  When all is 
considered, therefore, there is no room to doubt that the power of Congress extends to the 
entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide discretion. 
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1924). 
 107. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 108. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850). 
 109. 460 U.S. 1, 7 (1983).  In Moses H. Cone, the dispute arose over a construction 
company’s demand for payment of its costs due to delay and inaction by the hospital.  Id. at 6.  
After negotiations failed, the hospital filed an action for declaratory judgment asking for a 
declaration that it was not liable and that the construction company’s claims were not arbitrable.  
Id. at 7.  The construction company then demanded arbitration and, subsequently, filed an action 
to compel arbitration per § 4 of the FAA in federal district court.  Id.  The district stayed the 
action to compel pending resolution of the hospital’s state court lawsuit because both lawsuits 
involved the issue of whether the claims were arbitrable.  Id. at 8. 
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and “into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”110  Applying this 
holding to expansion of review of arbitration awards is difficult, but not 
impossible.  Since the Supreme Court found that Congress intended to move an 
arbitrable matter out of court as soon as possible, a priori, there must have 
been Congressional intent to not allow arbitrable matters back into court for a 
review of the merits of an arbitration award. 
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, a unanimous Supreme Court held 
“that a court must compel arbitration of otherwise arbitrable claims,” rejecting 
the notion that the main goal of the FAA was to urge quick resolution of 
disputes.111  The Court went on to state that the main concern of Congress in 
enacting the FAA “was to enforce private agreements into which parties had 
entered, and that concern requires that [the Court] rigorously enforce 
agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation, at least 
absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute.”112  At 
first blush, this holding seems to endorse the view that the Court would enforce 
a clause in an arbitration agreement requiring expanded judicial review.  
However, such a rendering of the Court’s language proves illusory. 
The Court will enforce an agreement to arbitrate in accord with 
Congressional intent, but a “counterveiling policy” can be found in the limited 
grounds for judicial review set forth in section 10 of the FAA.113  If faced with 
the issue of whether to permit a party-created standard of review, the Court 
would not need to look for a countervailing policy in another statute because 
the plain language of section 10 of the FAA explicitly provides instructions to 
the courts on when an award should be vacated.  These limited grounds 
“impose[d] upon the judicial review of arbitration modifies the general 
jurisdictional powers of federal courts.”114  Limited judicial review of awards 
maintains the integrity of arbitration and guarantees quick settlement of 
disputes—the preeminent goal of an arbitration agreement.115 
B. Cases Dealing with the Reach and Scope of the FAA 
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court found that a California 
statute requiring court consideration of claims brought under it ran afoul of 
 
 110. Id.  460 U.S. at 22. 
 111. 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).  In Byrd, a brokerage firm client sued in federal court for 
several violations of federal securities law and various state law claims.  Id. at 214.  The firm then 
sought to sever the state law claims and compel arbitration, which was denied by the district court 
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.  Id. at 215-6. 
 112. Id. at 221 (citation omitted). 
 113. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994). 
 114. Di  Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 231, 239 (1999). 
 115. Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of 
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 339 (2000). 
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section 2 of the FAA and violated the Supremacy Clause.116  In finding that the 
California statute nullified a valid agreement to arbitrate and was adverse to 
the FAA, the Court stated: “Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by 
allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts.  Such a 
course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by 
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate.”117  The Court further stated 
that the FAA “rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules 
under the Commerce Clause”118 and that the Act is applied in not only federal, 
but state courts as well.119 
Southland, at first glance, supports the proposition that parties may expand 
judicial review contractually with its militant defense of the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in the face of state judicial action.  Yet Southland can 
be construed to show the Court’s reluctance in allowing a dispute into court 
where it would be bogged down in costs and delay, when the dispute can be 
decided fully in arbitration pursuant to the parties’ wishes.  Additionally, if the 
Supreme Court were willing to hold that the FAA preempts an inconsistent 
state law, then it would be difficult to imagine that the Court would allow an 
inconsistent arbitration clause to trump the express directive found in section 
10 of the Act. 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme 
Court confronted the issue of whether statutory claims under the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act could be arbitrated.120  The Court held that parties could 
arbitrate these statutory claims stating that in an agreement 
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather 
than a judicial, forum.  It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of 
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.121 
The Court went on to find that “adaptability and access to expertise are 
hallmarks of arbitration” and that parties choose the “streamlined proceedings” 
of arbitration to avoid the extra “effort and expense” of litigation.122  This 
language illustrates the Supreme Court’s understanding that parties must give 
 
 116. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  The Court held that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a 
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by 
arbitration.”  Id. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. Id. at 11. 
 119. Id. at 14-15. 
 120. 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985).  The anti-trust claim arose out of Mitsubishi’s refusal to allow 
its dealer, Soler, to divert shipment of some vehicles to other locations.  Id. at 618.  Soler claimed 
Mitsubishi “had conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade.”  Id. at 620. 
 121. Id. at 628. 
 122. Id. at 633. 
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up the advantages of the judicial process, such as full review of an award, to 
reap the benefits of arbitration.  Creating a litigation-arbitration hybrid by 
contracting for expanded judicial review harms the integrity of both processes.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly to the issue of expanded review, Justice 
Blackmun wrote that the effectiveness of arbitration “requires that substantive 
review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal . . . .”123  The plain 
meaning of Justice Blackmun’s quote is that the Court will be reluctant to 
review arbitration awards for errors of law or fact, as the review of such 
awards should remain limited in order to protect the integrity of the arbitration 
process. 
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 124 the Supreme Court faced the 
issue of how far the FAA reached.  A state court had refused to stay a 
consumer’s lawsuit and compel arbitration under the FAA, finding no 
connection between interstate commerce and an exterminator contract.125  The 
Supreme Court found such a nexus by applying a “commerce in fact” test and 
again held that the primary purpose of the FAA was enforcement of parties’ 
agreements to arbitrate.126  More important is the Court’s statement that 
arbitration is favorable to parties like individual consumers who have relatively 
small claims and “need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”127  
Expanding judicial review beyond the narrow grounds set forth in the FAA 
would increase costs by allowing more appeals and, therefore, an unassuming 
consumer would have no inexpensive forum for dispute resolution if an 
expanding clause were placed in an consumer arbitration agreement. 
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Supreme Court decided 
who had the power to decide the arbitrability of a dispute under the FAA: an 
arbitration panel or the courts.128  The Court, in a unanimous decision, held 
that because one party had not agreed to allow the question of arbitrability to 
be decided by an arbitrator, the dispute over arbitrability should be decided by 
the courts.  The Court found that when a party agrees to arbitrate, the right to 
have a court decide the matter is greatly diminished, although “[t]he party still 
can ask a court to review the arbitrator’s decision, but the court will only set 
 
 123. Id. at 638. 
 124. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 125. Id. at 269. 
 126. Id. at 277-79. 
 127. Id. at 280. 
 128. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).  In First Options, the Kaplans had not signed the document 
requiring arbitration, but their wholly-owned investment company, MK Investments had.  Id. at 
941.  The arbitrators decided that they had the authority to resolve the dispute on the merits and 
did so against the Kaplans.  Id.  The district court refused to vacate the award and confirmed it, 
but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that the dispute with the Kaplans was not arbitrable.  
Id. 
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that decision aside in very unusual circumstances.”129  The Court said that 
when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision regarding arbitrability, “the court 
should give a considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his decision 
only in certain narrow circumstances.”130  With this language, the Court firmly 
stated that it will vacate an arbitration award only in narrow, very unusual 
situations.  Therefore, the threshold question for expanded judicial review is 
whether it is a “narrow” or “unusual” circumstance?  By the word “narrow,” 
the Court implied that the grounds for modification and vacatur were found in 
the Act and that reviewing awards for errors of law or fact was not a ground 
for vacatur.  By the word “unusual,” the Court stated grounds where the 
arbitrator’s misconduct tainted the arbitration process but, as the old adage 
goes “to err is human,” so it cannot be unusual for an arbitrator to misinterpret 
a law or make some kind of procedural mistake.131  Hence, by analyzing 
expanded judicial review through the Court’s language, it seems doubtful that 
such expanded review dictated by the parties is permissible. 
C. Choice-of-Law Clause Cases 
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees132 is of paramount 
importance to the issue at hand as its language is cited as authority in the 
Gateway Technologies and LaPine cases to support expanded review of 
arbitration awards through freedom of contract.133  In Volt, the Supreme Court 
held that a California statute permitting a court to stay arbitration until related 
litigation was resolved was not preempted by the FAA because the parties had 
stipulated in their arbitration agreement that the arbitration would be governed 
by California law.134  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion contained 
strong language favoring enforcement of the parties’ agreement by its terms: 
 
 129. Id. at 942.  The Court stated that these narrow circumstances are found in § 10 of the 
FAA and the manifest disregard standard.  Id. 
 130. Id. at 943. 
 131. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), where the Supreme Court stated: 
  As [the arbitrators’] award may be made without explanation of their reasons and 
without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal 
meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or 
‘material fact’ . . . cannot be examined.  Power to vacate an award is limited. 
  Id.  See also Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(“In order to advance the goals of arbitration, courts may vacate awards only for an overt 
disregard of the law and not merely for an erroneous interpretation.”). 
 132. 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 133. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995); 
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 134. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.  The dispute arose out of Volt’s claim for extra compensation it 
incurred in installing an electrical system on the campus of Stanford University.  Id.  The 
construction contract had an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law clause providing that 
California law would govern any disputes.  Id.  Volt demanded arbitration to resolve its claim and 
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[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself.  Indeed, 
such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA’s primary purpose of 
ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their 
terms.  Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and 
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see 
fit.135 
However, this holding giving “effect to the contractual rights and expectation 
of the parties”136 can be limited to parties agreeing to which laws will rule their 
arbitration.  A choice-of-law clause is an aspect of an arbitration agreement 
that will be enforced per its terms because there is no uniform set of arbitration 
procedures or rules and its enforcement does not violate any other FAA 
policy.137 
It is important to note that the dispute in Volt was over when or if 
arbitration was to occur, not whether the arbitrator made a correct award.  
Clauses that expand judicial review involve substantive, not procedural, 
aspects of the arbitration.138  A fair reading of the FAA would lead to the 
conclusion that, once an arbitrator makes an award, the FAA takes control by 
applying the sections permitting confirmation, modification or vacatur if the 
parties had agreed to allow this.139  Allowing parties to expand judicial review 
of awards beyond the grounds in section 10 of the FAA would definitely 
offend a policy in the FAA—section 10 itself.  Furthermore, the Supreme 
 
Stanford responded by filing a lawsuit in state court for fraud and breach against Volt and seeking 
indemnity from two others companies with whom Stanford had no arbitration agreement.  Id. at 
470-71.  Volt motioned to compel in the state court and Stanford motioned for a stay pursuant to 
a California statute that permitted a stay of an arbitration pending resolution of a lawsuit if parties 
to the lawsuit were not bound by the arbitration agreement.  Id. at 471. 
 135. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.  The Court further stated unequivocally that: 
  [t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural 
rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of 
private agreements to arbitrate.  Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable 
state rules governing the conduct of arbitration . . . simply does not offend the rule of 
liberal construction set forth in Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend any other policy 
embodied in the FAA. 
Id. at 476. 
 136. Id. at 479. 
 137. Id. at 476. 
 138. One commentator felt that 
  while parties are free to contract as to the procedure, scope, and forum of an 
arbitration, parties are not necessarily free to contract as to the extent of judicial review of 
an arbitral award.  An expansion of judicial review would go beyond merely contracting 
as to the scope or procedure of the arbitration and would be contracting as to the 
substantive enforcement of the award. 
Curtin, supra note 115, at 363. 
 139. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1994). 
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Court in Volt said parties are “generally free” in molding their own 
agreements.  To read this language as stating that the Supreme Court has given 
parties free reign over how their arbitration will be conducted before, during 
and after, would be to ignore a limiting adjective.  What the word “generally” 
implies is that there may be circumstances where the Court would refuse to 
enforce the parties’ agreement to arbitrate by its terms, yet the question 
remains if expanded judicial review would be one of these circumstances. 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.140 is another case 
concerning interpretation of a choice-of-law clause in an arbitration 
agreement.An arbitrator had included punitive damages in his award, but the 
district court vacated the award finding that the arbitrator had exceeded his 
powers.141  However, the Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision (Justice 
Thomas dissenting), overruled the vacatur finding that the choice-of-law or 
arbitration clauses did not intend to preclude the awarding of punitive 
damages.142  Finding the contract ambiguous, the Court applied the common 
law rule of construing the ambiguous language against the drafter and 
reinforced the principle that a contract should be read to give effect to all terms 
and to make all the terms consistent with one another.143 
This type of contractual construction may be necessary in the context of a 
clause calling for expanded judicial review.  For instance, consider an 
arbitration clause stating that “the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and 
binding on all parties except that any party may petition a court of competent 
jurisdiction for review of errors of law.”144  This clause appears to be 
ambiguous and misleading on its face by stating that the arbitration award will 
be final and binding, but that it can be appealed for any error of law.  This 
broad discretion in allowing a dispute into court directly conflicts with the final 
and binding language.  Which phrase should be given more importance?  It 
seems that the final and binding language rules the clause as “the judiciary is 
reluctant to interfere with arbitration awards because the very goal of binding 
arbitration is to avoid lengthy litigation.”145  Moreover, final and binding 
decisions are “crucial if arbitration is to result in the same legal rights as 
judicial litigation.”146 
 
 140. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  The clause at issue stated that New York law would govern any 
arbitration and the law of that state allows only judges, not arbitrators, to award punitive 
damages.  Id. at 53. 
 141. Id. at 54-55. 
 142. Id. at 62. 
 143. Id. at 62-63. 
 144. New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 57 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 145. Brian T. McCartney, Contracting for Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Can an 
“Errors of Law” Clause Provide Two Bites of the Apple?, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 151, 160 (1997). 
 146. 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND 
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 39.1.1 (1999). 
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D. Cases Regarding Economic Factors of Arbitration 
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph147 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,148 are probative on the 
issue of expanded review in that the Court raised the concerns it had about the 
cost effectiveness of arbitration.  In Green Tree Financial Corp., a party 
attempted to have an arbitration agreement silent on the issue of costs 
invalidated due to the prohibitive expense of the arbitration.149  The Court 
rejected the party’s argument because the party failed to show why the 
arbitration was expensive and held that such an invalidation of an agreement 
based on costs goes against the federal policy of encouraging arbitration.150  
This precedent is important in illustrating that the Court will look to economic 
factors in interpreting an arbitration agreement.  Therefore, it might not be 
outside the realm of reality for the Supreme Court to weigh the economic 
detriment that parties would suffer in submitting awards to heightened judicial 
review with the advantages of contractual freedom. 
The Circuit City case addressed whether employment contracts are beyond 
the grasp of the FAA.151  After finding that the FAA applied to all employment 
contracts except those for transportation workers, the Supreme Court stated: 
Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit 
that may be of importance in employment litigation, which often involves 
smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts.  These 
litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the Courts) would 
be compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often 
presented in disputes arising from the employment relationship.152 
With this pronouncement, it could be difficult for the Court not to take into 
consideration the economic burden on parties and the docket burden on the 
courts if parties were allowed to expand judicial review beyond what is set 
forth in the FAA. 
IV.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION 
AWARDS 
This Comment takes the position that courts should not allow parties to 
contractually expand judicial review of arbitration awards beyond the narrow 
grounds in the FAA.153  Before further expounding on the reasoning for this 
 
 147. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 148. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 149. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92. 
 150. Id. at 91-92. 
 151. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109. 
 152. Id. at 123. 
 153. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994). 
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stance154 and before examining the cases that support the limited review as 
established in the FAA, however, those cases that support contractually 
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards must be examined. 
A. Cases Allowing Expanded Judicial Review 
1. In re Fils et Cables D’Acier De Lens 
In re Fils et Cables D’Acier De Lens155 was the first case to allow parties 
to contract for expanded judicial review.  The arbitration provision at issue, as 
quoted by the Court, provided in part, that 
the court shall have the power to review (1) whether the findings of fact 
rendered by the arbitrator are, on the entire record of said arbitration 
proceedings, supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of 
law based on said findings of fact the award should be affirmed, modified or 
vacated.156 
An arbitration panel issued findings of fact and an award in favor of Fils et 
Cables, which sought confirmation in court while Midland Metals sought 
vacatur or modification of the damages portion of the award.157  The court 
recognized the key issue to be whether parties can contractually alter a federal 
court’s part in the arbitration process.158  The court then went through a short 
laundry list of reasons why contractual expansion of judicial review should not 
be allowed.159  However, the opinion moved on to say that arbitration is a 
“creature of contract”160 leading to a conclusion that a party will not be forced 
to enter into arbitration “under rules to which he has not assented.”161 
The court then shifted its analysis to determine if there is “a jurisdictional 
or public policy barrier” to parties being able to expand judicial review.162  The 
court found no jurisdictional barrier existed as the parties were in court based 
on diversity jurisdiction163 and then summarily dismissed any possible public 
policy impediment by holding that the process the parties agreed upon would 
be far less taxing on the court than a full trial and then reviewed the arbitration 
 
 154. See infra Part V. 
 155. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 156. Id. at 242 (quoting paragraph 13(c) of the parties’ contracts). 
 157. Id. at 243. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 243-44.  The court pointed to the limited grounds for vacatur and modification in 
the FAA, arbitration as a less expensive and less complicated alternative to adjudication, 
arbitration awards cannot be vacated for misinterpretation of the law, and that requiring 
arbitrators to explain awards diminishes the efficiency of arbitration.  Id. 
 160. In re Fils et Cables D’Acier De Lens, 584 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 161. Id. at 244. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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award under the parties’ contractually dictated standard.164  Through its 
review, the court confirmed part of the award, modified another part and 
remanded yet another issue to the arbitration panel for further consideration.165 
This decision should have little or no precedential value for several 
reasons.  First, the court cites no authority to support its conclusion that parties 
should be free to alter the roles of courts in arbitration.  By the court’s 
permissive reasoning, as long as no public policy or jurisdictional barriers 
existed, parties could provide for judicial review of an award “by flipping a 
coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”166  Second, the court failed to 
consider that sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, itself, are formidable public 
policy barriers to allowing contractual expansion.  Third, although Fils et 
Cables has not been expressly overruled, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
has strongly stated its preferences for adhering to the limited grounds for 
vacatur and modification in the FAA when reviewing awards.167 
A relatively recent decision from the Second Circuit, Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit Authority,168 is cited by Domke on 
Commercial Arbitration for the proposition that “parties may contractually 
provide for a court’s scope of review of an arbitration award.”169  The clause of 
the arbitration agreement at issue in Westinghouse read, as follows: “the 
review of the Court shall be limited to the question [sic] of whether or not the 
[arbitrator’s] determination is arbitrary, capricious or so grossly erroneous to 
 
 164. Id. at 244-45. 
 165. In re Fils et Cables, 584 F. Supp. at 247. 
 166. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
 167. See Office of Supply v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (“An 
award will not be set aside because of an error on the part of the arbitrators in their interpretation 
of the law.”); In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1214  (2d Cir. 1972) (“It is a truism that an arbitration 
award will not be vacated for a mistaken interpretation of law.”); John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-
Eze Sys., Inc., 623 F.2d 261, 264 (2d. Cir. 1980) (“This court has generally refused to second 
guess an arbitrator’s resolution of a contract dispute . . . [and] accorded the narrowest of readings 
to the [FAA’s] authorization to vacate awards. . . .”); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 
F.2d 1108, 1110(2d. Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is a well-settled proposition that judicial review of an 
arbitration award should be, and is, very narrowly limited.”); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City 
Dist. Council Carpenters Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Section 10 of the Act 
delineates the grounds upon which a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award.”); Barbier v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The award may be vacated 
only if at least one of the grounds specified in 9 U.S.C. §10 is found to exist.”); Folkways Music 
Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Arbitration awards are subject to 
very limited review in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling 
disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.”); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & 
Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Folkways Music 
Publishers, Inc., 989 F.2d at 111, for the limited grounds for vacatur). 
 168. 14 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 169. 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 85, § 34.15, at 27. 
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evidence bad faith.”170  The court held this arbitrary and capricious standard 
was permissible, finding it went against no public policy.171  However, this 
decision does not mean that the Second Circuit will enforce a clause expanding 
judicial review by an error of law standard.  First, the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard has already been recognized as a judicially created ground 
for vacatur, so the parties were merely incorporating this standard into their 
agreement.172  Second, the court rejected Westinghouse’s argument that the 
court should apply an “error of law” standard pursuant to New York law.173 
2. Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
In Gateway Technologies, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the 
first federal circuit to endorse the parties’ right to contractually expand judicial 
review of an arbitration award and applied the parties’ standard of de novo 
review for errors of law.174  MCI had won a bid for a contract with the Virginia 
Department of Corrections to implement a phone system that would allow 
prisoners to make collect calls without the need of operator assistance.175  MCI 
then subcontracted with Gateway, who agreed to furnish all the necessary 
technology for the system.176  The contract called for binding arbitration 
“‘except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal.’”177  A dispute arose over 
the design of the system, resulting in MCI implementing its own system and 
terminating the contract with Gateway, and arbitration ensued.178  The 
arbitrator found MCI had breached the contract and awarded Gateway actual 
and punitive damages, leading MCI to file a motion to vacate the award in 
district court, while Gateway simultaneously filed a motion to confirm.179  The 
district court confirmed the award, but applied a “harmless error standard” of 
review rather than the more scrutinizing “errors of law” standard, leading to 
MCI’s appeal.180 
The Fifth Circuit began its opinion by admitting that judicial review of 
arbitration awards is usually very narrow and can only be vacated on the 
grounds set out in section 10 of the FAA.181  However, citing both 
 
 170. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 14 F.3d at 821-22 (quoting Article 8.03(c) of the parties’ 
contract). 
 171. Id. at 824. 
 172. For a discussion of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, see supra Part II.C. 
 173. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 14 F.3d at 822. 
 174. 64 F.3d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (quoting Article 9 of the parties’ contract dated Apr. 29, 1991). 
 178. Id. at 995-96. 
 179. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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Mastrobuono and Volt, the court stated that parties may expand judicial review 
through their contract.182  The Fifth Circuit went on to say that “[b]ecause 
these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual 
provision supplements the FAA’s default standard of review and allows for de 
novo review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.”183  The Fifth 
Circuit found that, by not reviewing the award pursuant to the parties’ 
agreement, the district court had erred and, therefore, frustrated the intent of 
the parties.184  Relying once again on Volt, the court held that when parties 
contract “to subject an arbitration award to expanded judicial review, federal 
arbitration policy demands that the court conduct its review according to the 
terms of the arbitration contract.”185  From this bold proclamation, the court 
applied the “errors of law” standard of review to the actual and punitive 
damages awards and confirmed the actual damages award, while the punitive 
damages of $2,000,000 was vacated because the arbitrator failed to apply 
Virginia law properly.186 
Gateway Technologies raises several noteworthy issues.  First, the court 
does not address the apparent ambiguity in the contract’s arbitration clause.  
The clause stated that the parties agreed to binding arbitration; however, except 
that the award was subject to appeal for “errors of law.”  This clause appears to 
be self-contradictory.  According to the Dictionary of Dispute Resolution, 
“binding” is defined as “[o]bligatory; creat[ing] a legal or social indebtedness 
of obligation . . . .”187  By calling for the review of a “binding” award, the 
parties sought the proverbial second bite at the apple of arbitration.  In essence, 
the parties appeared to be contracting for non-binding arbitration, which would 
mean that the award did not create an obligation.  Therefore, the parties should 
have filed a regular lawsuit, rather than motions to confirm and vacate the 
award. 
Second, expanding the scope of review to include “errors of law” ignores 
the FAA’s intent to provide for a quick and efficient dispute resolution 
process.188  Clauses such as “errors of law” included in arbitration agreements 
would permit a party unsatisfied with an arbitration award (like MCI) to claim 
an “error of law,” which would place the dispute into court and result in parties 
spending more time and money to resolve the dispute than if they had simply 
filed a lawsuit in the first place.189  If parties are primarily concerned with 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 997.  See id. at 997 n.3 for a reference to Volt. 
 184. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 997-99. 
 187. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 59. 
 188. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). 
 189. See McCartney, supra note 145, at 162. 
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“avoiding irrational or excessive results” rather than “finality and efficiency,” 
they “may be better off in conventional litigation.”190 
The third concern was recognized by the Gateway Technologies court: the 
great disparity in financial resources between the parties, albeit in the context 
of Gateway’s fiduciary claim against MCI.191  Perhaps the court should have 
focused on this aspect of the case in a different way.  The telecommunications 
giant subcontracted with a smaller organization, Gateway, to implement the 
phone system and only when MCI determined that it could make more money 
by not using Gateway’s system did MCI terminate the contract.192  It is not 
difficult to imagine that the party with more financial resources and bargaining 
power will want, first, an arbitration clause to protect itself from litigation 
costs and jury awards and, second, an expanded judicial review of an award if 
it suffers huge losses at the arbitration level like MCI did.  Adherence to the 
limited grounds for vacatur or modification of the FAA193 may be the only 
safeguard against a party using this strategy to cover itself from all angles. 
Finally, did the Gateway Technologies court properly apply Volt?  It seems 
it may not have.  Volt dealt solely with whether the FAA preempted California 
law, which was the choice-of-law in the arbitration agreement.194  In Volt the 
Supreme Court found that there was no preemptive provision in the FAA195 
and that parties were free to contract for any arrangement they desired 
provided that the terms did not do “violence to the policies behind the 
FAA.”196  While there is no provision regarding preemption in the FAA, there 
are two sections establishing grounds for vacatur, modification, and correction.  
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s labeling of the grounds for vacatur in the FAA 
as “a default standard of review” has no basis in the statutory language or the 
legislative history of the FAA.197  The Gateway Technologies court quoted 
Volt to support its statement that parties may “specify by contract the rules 
under which [the] arbitration will be conducted.”198  This reliance on Volt is 
misplaced.  Without a doubt, the Supreme Court in Volt held that parties could 
 
 190. Steven P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 261-62 (1999). 
 191. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 1001.  To illustrate this disparity, MCI’s 1999 revenues totaled 
$37,120,000,000.  THE NEW YORK TIMES ALMANAC 2001: THE ALMANAC OF RECORD 347 
(John W. Wright ed., 2000) (citing Fortune Magazine). 
 192. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995. 
 193. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994). 
 194. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470 
(1989). 
 195. Id. at 477. 
 196. Id. at 479. 
 197. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). 
 198. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 
U.S. 52, 57 (1995)). 
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contract for the rules that would govern the arbitration;199 however, the Court 
stated nowhere that parties were free to contract as to how a federal court 
would conduct its proceedings.  The Fifth Circuit found that the contractual 
expansion of judicial review supplements the standards set forth in the FAA,200 
yet what this expansion actually does is supercede the FAA grounds by 
replacing what Congress found to be the grounds for vacatur.  Due to its 
importance, this point shall be discussed further both in this subpart and in Part 
V. 
3. Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland 
Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland, an unpublished opinion from the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, cited the Gateway Technologies decision as 
guidance when that court was confronted with the question of expanded 
judicial review.201  The dispute in the case arose out of McLeland’s 
employment with Syncor International, a pharmaceuticals distributor and 
owner and operator of pharmacies.202  As a result of the employment, which 
ended in 1994 only for him to be rehired shortly thereafter on a temporary 
basis, McLeland signed three separate agreements each promising that he 
would not compete against Syncor, solicit any Syncor customers or encourage 
other Syncor employees to leave the company.203  While employed with 
Syncor, McLeland started his own pharmacy, sought and received investment 
capital from a Syncor employee, solicited the business of Syncor’s two largest 
accounts in the area, and successfully recruited an employee from a pharmacy 
related to Syncor.204 
As a result of McLeland’s conduct, Syncor demanded arbitration pursuant 
to an agreement signed by the parties.205  This agreement stated that the 
“‘arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal 
reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by judicial review for 
such error.’”206  The arbitrator entered an award for Syncor, which included all 
of the stock in McLeland’s new enterprise, and Syncor filed a motion in 
district court for confirmation.207  The award was confirmed over McLeland’s 
 
 199. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 201. 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (per 
curiam). 
 202. Id. at *1. 
 203. Id.  McLeland had been a Regional Manager for Syncor but, after being terminated for 
business reasons, was rehired as a temporary pharmacist.  Id. 
 204. Id. at *2. 
 205. Id. at *1-2. 
 206. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 
(4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997). 
 207. Id. at *3. 
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objections and he appealed, claiming the arbitration was invalid because it was 
conducted ex parte, the dispute was non-arbitrable, and the district court 
applied the wrong standard of judicial review in confirming the award.208 
After ruling against McLeland on the first two issues, the Fourth Circuit 
agreed with him that the district court erred in not reviewing the arbitration 
award under the arbitration agreement’s heightened de novo standard.209  
However, in applying that heightened standard, the court found “that the 
arbitrator did not commit error, either legal or factual,” and since the district 
court’s error was harmless, the Fourth Circuit refused to remand the case.210 
The per curiam opinion of the Fourth Circuit relied exclusively on 
Gateway Technologies in holding that the expanded judicial review set out in 
the parties’ contract was permitted.211  As this Comment has argued, the 
Gateway decision has its flaws, which do not bear repetition; however, there 
are additional reasons why the Syncor decision should not be given much 
weight.  First, and most obviously, it is an unpublished opinion, so it is of little, 
if any, precedential value,212 and, likewise, it should not be assumed that the 
Fourth Circuit has definitively ruled in favor of allowing expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards.  Similarly, the opinion was per curiam, which 
suggests that no judge wanted to take credit for such a tenuous holding. 
The second major analytical issue in Syncor is the construction of the 
review-expanding clause.  The first part of the clause stated, “‘[t]he arbitrator 
shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning . . . .’”213  
By denying the arbitrator this power, this clause attempted to shoehorn its 
expanded standard for judicial review into section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which 
allows vacatur “[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . . .”214  It 
should raise eyebrows that the parties sought to deny an arbitrator a power no 
parties would ever agree that he has—the power to commit legal errors.  It 
should also be noted that this would establish an extraordinarily high standard 
for arbitrators, which few would be able to meet.  No human judgment is 
perfect and this type of perfection-seeking clause could result in frivolous 
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attempts to vacate an award for any mistake, even a harmless one, which the 
arbitrator could make during the course of arbitration.215 
The second part of the clause stated “‘the award may be vacated or 
corrected by judicial review for any such error.’”216  Here, the parties made the 
mistake of placing the standard back outside of section 10 of the FAA by 
allowing for review of the “error” (a standard not mentioned in section 10), 
instead of review of an arbitrator overstepping his powers.  Furthermore, the 
second part of the clause also violated section 11 of the FAA by allowing 
correction for errors of law, a ground not mentioned in that section.217  
Therefore, the court could have found that the standard of review was the 
“exceeding powers” of section 10(a)(4), but that the negative power put forth 
in the agreement was a cornerstone assumption in all arbitration contracts, and 
need not be mentioned, leading to a regular limited review under the FAA. 
4. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. 
The last, and possibly most persuasive, decision permitting the expanded 
judicial review of arbitration awards is LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera 
Corp.218  The facts of this case revolved around complicated commercial 
transactions involving the manufacturing and marketing of computer disk 
drives.219  The arbitration clause at issue directed that “[t]he Court shall vacate, 
modify, or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in 
the [FAA], (ii) where the arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by the 
substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are 
erroneous.”220  LaPine filed an action in district court alleging a breach of a 
trade agreement, and although Kyocera was successful in compelling 
arbitration, the resulting awards were in favor of LaPine.221  LaPine 
subsequently petitioned the district court for confirmation of the awards, while 
Kyocera sought vacatur or modification of the awards.222 
The district court confirmed the award and refused to review the award 
“for errors of law or fact.”223  In doing so, the district court refused to apply 
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both In re Fils et Cables de Lens and Gateway Technologies.224  The court, 
with the help of a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case,225 held that “its 
power to adjudicate in the exercise of . . . jurisdiction, particularly where 
conferred by statute as here, cannot be changed or altered by the agreement of 
the parties.”226  The district court distinguished Gateway Technologies from 
Mastrobuono and Volt by showing that the latter two dealt with the powers of 
parties to dictate “the subject matter and rules of arbitration,” not with the 
powers of parties to expand judicial review of arbitral awards.227  The district 
court noted “that while arbitration is non-judicial dispute resolution, 
confirmation or vacation is not part of such a proceeding, but is a judicial act 
provided for by statute.”228 
Kyocera appealed the district court decision, and the Ninth Circuit boiled 
the issue down to whether “federal court review of an arbitration agreement 
[is] necessarily limited to the grounds set forth in the FAA or can the court 
apply greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?”229  The court held that 
the parties’ agreement must be honored by reviewing the award according to 
the agreed upon standard pursuant to several Supreme Court decisions making 
“it clear that the primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of 
private agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with agreements’ terms.”230  The 
court failed to make the distinction, as the district court had,231 that Volt dealt 
with rules of arbitration and not the parties’ powers to direct court review.  Volt 
and the other cases the court relied upon232 were interested with “the scope and 
procedural regulations of the arbitral process, not the substantive enforcement 
of awards or of the arbitration agreement itself.”233  In response to this 
procedural argument, the Ninth Circuit 
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recognize[d] that agreeing to the scope of review by a court is not precisely the 
same as agreeing to the scope of the arbitration itself.  Nevertheless, the 
standards against which the work of the arbitrator will be measured are 
inexorably intertwined with the arbitration’s scope, affect its whole structure, 
and may even encourage the arbitrator to adhere to a high standard of decision 
making.234 
Despite its persuasive reasoning, the court failed to address three problems 
that will arise when federal courts agree to enforce parties’ agreements to 
expand judicial review of awards.  First, forcing a judge to adjudicate based on 
the parties’ private contracts presents serious implications for the institutional 
integrity of the judiciary.235  Secondly, petitions seeking expanded review 
outside of the FAA will end up in the crowded court system before busy and 
perhaps uninterested judges, which frustrates the party winning at arbitration 
seeking award enforcement and encourages stubborn parties bent on delay.236  
Finally, only through the limited standards of review in the FAA “can the 
integrity of the arbitral process be maintained and the quick resolution of 
disputes be assured, which, in the end, is the ultimate goal of any contractual 
provision involving the resolution of disputes.”237 
The LaPine court argued that if courts refuse to apply the parties’ 
“searching review” of an award, then the court is ignoring the wishes of the 
parties in defiance of what Congress had intended.238  However, what did 
Congress intend by enacting the limited standards of review of awards in 
section 10 of the FAA?  Since the legislative history is silent on the intent, it 
would be safe to assume that Congress meant to limit judicial intervention in 
the arbitration process by allowing parties to attempt to vacate awards only in 
very specific, restrictive circumstances.239  The LaPine court then rejected the 
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dicta found in Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.240 
concerning creation of jurisdiction by contract by saying that the FAA was not 
a jurisdictional statute limiting or conferring power on federal courts, but “a 
regulation of commerce.”241  The Ninth Circuit concluded its opinion by 
holding that the Act encourages agreements that expand judicial review and 
that “the FAA is not an apotropaion designed to avert overburdened court 
dockets; it is designed to avert interference with the contractual rights of the 
parties.”242  Yet there is a good amount of legislative history that refutes the 
court’s claim and states one of the purposes of the Act was to reduce the 
burden on courts.243 
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence in LaPine acknowledges that Congress was 
silent on whether courts could apply parties’ standards of judicial review, but 
finds, due to the strong policy of freedom of contract, that Congress would 
probably not object to enforcement of the parties’ agreement.244  The 
concurrence makes an interesting point that what district courts would be doing 
in reviewing arbitration awards would be no different than what district courts 
already do in hearing appeals regarding decisions from bankruptcy courts or 
administrative courts.245  There is one important distinction.  Appeals from 
those bodies are granted by Congress, while appeals of arbitration agreements 
are granted by the parties to the arbitration. 
Besides possibly misconstruing Congressional intent, Supreme Court 
rulings and the public policies underlying arbitration, the question remains of 
whether the Ninth Circuit ignored its own precedent in allowing contractual 
expansion of judicial review.  In A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough,246 
the Ninth Circuit stated that “various policy arguments urging tighter judicial 
review of arbitration awards are not persuasive.  Such a course would 
undermine the strong federal policy encouraging arbitration as a ‘prompt, 
economical and adequate’ method of dispute resolution for those who agree to 
it.”247  Stronger language cutting against the expansion of judicial review can 
be found in San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay 
Terminals Ltd.248  In this decision, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
[T]he statutory grounds for vacating or modifying the award of arbitrators are 
stated in [sections 10 and 11 of the Act] and neither section authorizes the 
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setting aside of an award “on grounds of erroneous finding of fact or 
misinterpretation of law” . . . Had Congress contemplated that any different 
rule should now become operative, or that a mere error of law should be a 
basis for setting aside an award, it would have no difficulty in drafting a 
separate subdivision of sections 10 or 11 which would say that.249 
The LaPine decision goes completely in the opposite direction and finds that 
parties, not Congress, may expand the grounds for review under the FAA.  It is 
strange that the LaPine court chose not to directly distinguish or overrule either 
of these cases, which seemingly conflict directly with LaPine’s holding. 
In conclusion, LaPine raises the question of whether the FAA is a license 
for parties to interfere with the federal judicial process. The LaPine district 
court opinion may have answered this question best: “The role of the federal 
courts cannot be subverted to serve private interests at the whim of contracting 
parties.”250 
B. Cases Rejecting the Notion of Party Created Expanded Review 
1. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals officially created a split among the 
circuits in June 2001 with its decision in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.251  In 
1993, Bowen, on several occasions, saw an “oily sheen” on a creek located on 
his property.252  After an independent study and an Oklahoma Corporate 
Commission investigation, it was determined that an Amoco pipeline was 
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leaking and caused the contamination.253  Due to Amoco’s continued failure to 
admit responsibility, Bowen filed a lawsuit in federal district court seeking 
damages for tort, breach of contract and exemplary damages.254  Amoco 
responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration, which the district court 
granted pursuant to the original easement agreement signed by both of the 
parties’ predecessors in interest.255  Just prior to arbitration, Amoco was 
ordered to uncover portions of its pipeline showing, with the help of expert 
analysis, that over 1,000 feet of pipeline had been replaced in 1950, that the 
soil around the pipeline was contaminated and that it was a leak in the pipeline 
that resulted in the contamination of Bowen’s creek.256  Bowen and Amoco 
agreed that the arbitration would be governed by the Rules for Non 
Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes with one modification: 
expanded scope of judicial review of the arbitration award.257  More to the 
point, they agreed that either party had the power to appeal an award within 
thirty days to the district court “‘on the grounds that the award is not supported 
by the evidence.’”258  The arbitration panel awarded Bowen over $3,000,000 
payable to an escrow fund to clean up the creek, $100,000 for damage to 
property value, $1,200,000 for nuisance, $1,000,000 in punitive damages and 
$41,000 for investigation costs.259  Bowen filed a motion for confirmation per 
section 9 of the FAA, and Amoco, in turn, filed a motion for vacatur of the 
award pursuant to the arbitration agreement.260  The district court refused to 
apply the expanded scope of judicial review and confirmed the arbitration 
award in favor of Bowen.261  Amoco then appealed seeking vacatur and 
remand to the arbitrator or vacatur and remand to the district court to review 
the award pursuant to the expanded review provided for in the arbitration 
agreement.262 
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion began by making it clear that the FAA does 
not create federal jurisdiction or any new rights, but creates a body of law 
governing arbitration agreements.263  The court then stated that its review of 
arbitration awards was “strictly limited” and “highly deferential” to the 
arbitrator under the FAA.264  The reason, the court stated, for the employment 
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of this strict review and use of caution in reviewing awards is that the 
“‘purpose behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of 
court proceedings.’  A court may not, therefore, independently judge an 
arbitration award.”265  The court unequivocally stated that an award may only 
be vacated under the limited statutory or judicially created grounds and that the 
reasoning behind the FAA “do not support a rule allowing parties to alter the 
judicial process by private contract.”266  The court recognized, through 
Supreme Court decisions, that parties have the contractual freedom to structure 
arbitration agreements to their own liking and that the court’s decision “must 
further the FAA’s primary policy ensuring judicial enforcement of private 
agreements to arbitrate.”267 
The court identified the LaPine and Gateway Technologies decisions 
allowing expanded judicial review, but disagreed with those decisions’ 
conclusions that Supreme Court precedent obliged the enforcement of 
contractually expanded judicial review.268  The Tenth Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court “has never said parties are free to interfere with the judicial 
process . . . [and] no authority clearly allows private parties to determine how 
federal courts review arbitration awards.”269  The court pointed out that Volt 
and other cases favoring party crafted arbitration “simply do not dictate that 
courts submit to varying standards of review imposed by private contract.”270  
The court found that allowing enforcement of expanded judicial review would 
be illogical because: 
The FAA’s limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process 
and prevents courts from enforcing parties’ agreements to arbitrate only to 
refuse to respect the results of the arbitration.  These limited standards 
manifest a legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring arbitration by 
preserving the independence of the arbitration process.  Unlike § 4 of the 
FAA, . . . the provisions governing judicial review of awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-
11, contain no language requiring district courts to follow parties’ 
agreements.271 
This explanation is why the Bowen court’s analysis is superior to the opinions 
in Gateway Technologies and LaPine—it takes into account the actual 
language of the FAA and is able to recognize that the Supreme Court had not 
yet even come close to weighing in on the issue.  Without specific direction 
from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit looked to the next strongest 
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possible authorities for guidance: the language Congress used in the Act and 
the nature of arbitration itself.  The court cited with favor Chicago 
Typographical Union and UHC Management Co.—two cases from the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits, respectively, that have expressed disapproval of expanded 
review through dicta.272 
The Tenth Circuit then went on to explain why expanded judicial review 
would undermine the independence of the arbitration system through practical 
consideration.  First, for awards to be effective, courts must first enforce the 
arbitration agreements and then enforce the awards resulting from the 
arbitration.273  Next, the court stated that applying expanded standards of 
judicial review would put a court in the untenable position of having to review 
proceedings that may have been guided by “unfamiliar rules and procedures,” 
which parties are not permitted to do.274  The court gave another reason why 
the independence of arbitration would be threatened by expanded review and, 
therefore, would blur the distinction between arbitration and litigation.  
Arbitrators are chosen for their ability to create innovative remedies, but 
expanded review would force courts to review “that which it would not do,” 
and would reduce an arbitrator’s eagerness to sculpt customized solutions “for 
fear the decision will be vacated by a reviewing court.”275  The court held that 
parties are not permitted to contract for expanded review of awards beyond the 
grounds set forth in the FAA and judicially crafted standards, but that they 
could contract for an appellate arbitration panel as the Seventh Circuit 
suggested.276 
The strength of the Bowen opinion lies in its ability to balance the variety 
of interests involved in the issue of expanded judicial review of arbitration 
awards: the parties, the courts and the arbitration system in general.  The Tenth 
Circuit is on strong footing in finding that the FAA’s limited grounds of review 
are as significant as the Act’s instruction to courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements since these limited grounds ensure “that the outcome of arbitration 
would be as binding and as unassailable as the promise to participate in the 
[arbitration] process.”277  The court’s fear that expanded review of arbitration 
awards would threaten the independence of the arbitration process is on 
equally solid ground because of the dangers of arbitration becoming entangled 
in the process of litigation.  As Professor Hans Smit has so ably stated: 
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Exclusion of judicial review of arbitral awards for errors of fact or law is one 
of the foundations on which the social desirability . . . of arbitration is firmly 
built.  For if arbitral awards could be reviewed for errors of law or fact, 
arbitration would easily degenerate into a device for adding still another 
instance to the usual three instances of litigation in ordinary courts.  It is 
exactly to avoid this socially most reprehensible consequence that the law 
straightforwardly excludes review of arbitral awards for errors of fact or 
law. . . . [T]his would not be the case if arbitration created merely a 
preliminary instance to ordinary court proceedings.278 
2. Cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
The Seventh Circuit weighed in on the issue of expanded review through 
Chicago Typographical Union, where Judge Posner stated: 
An agreement to submit a dispute over the interpretation of a . . . contract to 
arbitration is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator’s 
interpretation.  If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration 
panel to review the arbitrator’s award. But they cannot contract for judicial 
review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.279 
In LaPine, the majority opinion criticized this statement almost to the point of 
incredulity by saying the Seventh Circuit failed to explain its reasoning and felt 
“the court’s cryptic assertion about jurisdiction [was] dicta.”280  The LaPine 
court further criticized the Seventh Circuit’s stance on jurisdiction by claiming 
that the FAA was not a jurisdiction granting statute, but a regulation of 
commerce.281  Yet Chicago Typographical was not a case asserting any rights 
under the Act, but was a dispute over labor arbitration.282  When faced with the 
union’s challenge of an arbitration award, the Seventh Circuit replied: 
Federal courts do not review the soundness of arbitration awards . . . [The 
arbitrator’s] interpretation of the contract binds the court asked to enforce the 
award or to set it aside.  The court is forbidden to substitute its own 
interpretation even if convinced that the arbitrator’s interpretation was not only 
wrong, but plainly wrong.283 
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Hence, the language in Chicago Typographical was directed at an argument 
made by the union and, while dicta, was a strong argument against allowing 
expanded judicial review through the parties’ fiat.  The Bowen court cited 
Chicago Typographical mainly for the language suggesting that parties who 
agree to have expanded review should, instead, contract for an appellate 
arbitration board.  However, in a footnote, Bowen sheds light on this 
jurisdictional issue by recognizing the dilemma courts would face in having to 
vacate awards that courts would not usually vacate under federal statutory or 
common law.284  The Bowen court then avoided deciding the jurisdictional 
issue by holding parties cannot interfere with the judicial process.285 
More recent decisions by the Seventh Circuit have further illustrated that 
Circuit’s unwillingness to allow expanded judicial review of awards.286  
Perhaps the strongest indication of how the Seventh Circuit would rule if faced 
with a clause expanding judicial review is found in Bavarati v. Josephthal, 
Lyon & Ross, Inc., in which Judge Posner declared: 
Judicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it ought not be 
called “review” at all.  By including an arbitration clause in their contract the 
parties agree to submit disputes arising out of the contract to a nonjudicial 
forum, and we do not allow the disappointed party to bring his dispute into 
court by the back door, arguing that he is entitled to appellate review of the 
arbitrators’ decision.287 
It is, therefore, safe to say that the Seventh Circuit would limit review of 
arbitration awards to the grounds found in the FAA and the judicially-created 
exceptions. 
Support for rejecting the party-created, expanded standards for judicial 
review can also be found in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in UHC Management 
Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp.288  In this case, the losing party at arbitration 
 
 284. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 n.8 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 285. Id. at 937. 
 286. See, e.g., Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have 
repeatedly held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides the exclusive grounds for setting aside an 
arbitration award under the FAA.”); DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher 
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adjudication is that unless the parties provide otherwise, an arbitrator’s award is not appealable.  
It is, however, subject to limited judicial review.”). 
 287. Bavarati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 288. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).  Strong language by the Eighth Circuit against expanded 
judicial review can also be found in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., in which the 
court stated: 
  an arbitrator’s conclusions on substantive matters may be vacated only when the 
award demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law where the arbitrators correctly state 
the law and then proceed to disregard it, if the award is otherwise irrational, or if any of 
the explicit grounds for vacation or modification set forth in sections 10 and 11 of the Act 
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claimed that the term in the arbitration clause saying arbitrators would be 
“bound by controlling law” meant that the parties had agreed to expanded 
judicial review of the award.289  In response to this claim, the court held it is 
murky as to whether parties have input into the way “a federal court will 
review an arbitration award when Congress has ordained a specific, self-
limiting procedure for how such review is to occur.”290  The Eighth Circuit 
then stated that section 9 of the FAA is a Congressional command to courts to 
confirm an award when the grounds in sections 10 and 11 of the Act do not 
apply.291  The court went on to doubt whether parties may agree to force a 
federal court to ignore the FAA, citing the dissent in LaPine as support and 
raising its concerns over possible harm that expanded review could have on the 
integrity of the courts and the arbitration process.292  However, the court 
warned it would reserve its judgment on this subject because the parties’ 
arbitration agreement did not clearly express the intent to have an expanded 
standard applied.293 
The statement of the Eighth Circuit that it would wait until it sees a clause 
expressly expanding review of awards to rule on its enforceability seems to 
bring the above quoted passages into the realm of obiter dictum.  However, this 
may not weaken the strength of the court’s analysis.  The court could have 
simply started off with its analysis that the clause did not show the parties’ 
intent, found it was unclear, and disposed of the case.  Instead, the court 
handed down a strong statutory and policy based argument, albeit with guarded 
language, against expanded review.  The court’s intent may have been that, in 
not wanting to rock the boat by expressly disagreeing with Gateway 
Technologies and LaPine, it was sending a message to parties in the Eighth 
Circuit that if they attempted to contract for expanded judicial review they 
would have a difficult time convincing the court. 
V.  WHY REJECTION OF EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AWARDS IS THE 
CORRECT APPROACH 
While this section of the Comment may take several turns, or even detours, 
it will attempt to stay on the road to show that allowing parties to expand 
judicial review of awards by agreement is unacceptable for two broad reasons.  
 
are present. . . . These grounds have often been deemed the exclusive grounds for vacation 
or modification. 
783 F.2d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 289. UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id.  The pertinent clause of § 9 states: “[T]he court must grant such an order [of 
confirmation] unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 
11 of this title.”  9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994). 
 292. UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997-98. 
 293. Id. at 998. 
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First, it will threaten the integrity of the arbitration process because of 
additional costs and time, and will lead to arbitration becoming another form of 
adjudication rather than the alternative to litigation that it is supposed to be. 
Second, parties cannot alter the federal court process or create federal 
jurisdiction solely by their contract without Congress stating that they may do 
so. 
A. Endangering the Integrity of the Arbitration Process 
In 1965, Professor Martin Domke, the eminent scholar of arbitration,  
wrote: 
Courts do not wish to reopen an arbitration proceeding in another forum, by 
reviewing the merits of an award. Such a review would lead to a second 
proceeding with legal technicalities that the parties intended to avoid.  It would 
substitute the court’s judgment for that of the arbitrators and destroy the very 
aim of arbitration, which is to have a speedy determination of the issues 
submitted to experts in whom the parties had expressed confidence.294 
This passage still rings true today.  Expanded judicial review frustrates the 
whole process of arbitration to the extent that arbitration would no longer look 
like arbitration at all.  A long-standing platitude of arbitration is that parties 
agreeing to settle their dispute by arbitration enter into a quid pro quo: a 
limited right of appeal of the award in exchange for a cheap and quick 
resolution of the dispute.295  Therefore, expanded judicial review would wreck 
the advantages of arbitration by adding costs and delay.  A powerful reason for 
allowing judicial review only under the limited aspects of the FAA is that 
parties will receive a resolution in a “speedy and efficient manner.”296 
Consider, for instance, the dispute in LaPine.  The arbitration award was 
entered in August 1994 and the motion to vacate was filed in November of the 
same year.297  The district court denied this motion thirteen months later in 
December 1995.298  The appellate decision, which reversed and remanded to 
the district court, was handed down in December 1997, almost two years to the 
day after the district court decision.299  If the parties did not settle and the case 
went back to the district court on remand, it would be safe to assume that it 
would take another year for the district court to decide the case.  Taking this 
line of reasoning a step further, if the district court vacated the award and 
ordered a new arbitration, where would the parties be?  They would have spent 
five years of their time on the dispute, spent an untold amount of money on 
 
 294. MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 99 (1965). 
 295. Younger, supra note 190, at 241. 
 296. Smit, supra note 278, at 147. 
 297. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 298. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 299. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 884. 
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court fees and attorneys and they would not be one iota closer to a resolution.  
In fact, due to the added time and expense, the parties would have been better 
off filing suit in a court of law rather than seeking arbitration under their 
expanded standard.300 
The fact that arbitration has made headway into many areas of the law 
means that more and more people and businesses are affected by the process.  
The consumer, employee or small business may sign an arbitration agreement 
unwittingly or with the knowledge that the party with superior bargaining 
power (manufacturer, employer, large company) could simply walk away if the 
weaker party did not agree to its terms.301  It would be a manifest injustice to 
then make the process that the weaker party agrees to more expensive with the 
specter of expanded judicial review hanging above the process.  Not only was 
Congress concerned with providing a cheaper and quicker means of dispute 
resolution in 1925,302 but today Congress is still concerned with providing 
parties, especially employees and consumers, the great benefits of 
arbitration.303 
An example of how beneficial arbitration can be to an individual is in the 
area of employment disputes—an aspect of the law that cuts across all classes.  
A conservative average of the length of civil cases is two and one-half years 
(with some taking as long as eight years) with the length only expected to grow 
in our litigious system.304  By contrast, the average time for resolution of 
arbitration cases is 8.6 months.305  In litigating an employment dispute, the 
costs are at a minimum $10,000 even if the case does not go to trial, but if the 
case is fully adjudicated the cost rises to a minimum of $50,000.306  Although 
 
 300. See Younger, supra note 190, at 261-62. 
 301. See Carbonneau, supra note 277, at 1956. 
 302. See Allied Bruce-Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (“We agree that 
Congress, when enacting [the FAA], had the needs of customers, as well as others, in mind . . . 
Indeed, arbitration’s advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining about 
a product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”). 
 303. In the debate over The Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, Senator 
Sessions said: 
  Arbitration is one the best means of dispute resolution and one that most consumers 
and employees can afford.  Consumers and employees generally cannot afford a team of 
lawyers to represent them.  And their claims are often not big enough so that a lawyer 
would take the case on a . . . contingent fee. . . . If [the consumer or employee] can afford 
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146 CONG. REC. S10624 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2000) (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
 304. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 55 (1998). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 56. 
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there is no definitive study of employment arbitration costs, one study posits 
that costs could be as low as $3,000.307  Consequently, allowing expanded 
review in this area would completely erase the time and money saved by an 
employee wishing to settle his dispute by arbitration. 
Since arbitration is faster, more cost effective and more definite than 
litigation, more parties are able to seek justice by utilizing arbitration than they 
would in the world of litigation.308  Expanding judicial review would add 
“another tier to the time-consuming litigation process, rather than avoiding that 
process.”309  American Arbitration Association Consumer Rules require small-
claim consumers to pay no filing fee and only a nominal $125 fee to the 
arbitrator with the businesses paying the remainder of the costs.310  This 
advantage would be eliminated if that company could then appeal an award 
and force the matter into court.  Further studies show that arbitration when the 
amount in controversy is less than $50,000 takes, on average, six months from 
the filing to the rendering of an award.311  Furthermore, by submitting the 
claim to arbitration the parties gain access to a resolution process much faster 
than in litigation with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) reporting 
that the time for resolution averages about 110 days from the date of 
submission.312 
The Supreme Court has supported the premise that Congress intended 
arbitration to be a quick process not subject to the delay inherent in the court 
system.313  One study shows that in the period between 1960 and 1994 filings 
in federal district courts rose 216% while filings in courts of appeals rose an 
astounding 1,139%.314  Since arbitration is less expensive than litigation, 
parties are free to spend the money saved on “more socially productive 
purposes” and arbitration helps the judiciary by lightening its load of cases and 
 
 307. Id. at 54-55. 
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only honor the plain meaning of the [FAA] but also the unmistakably clear congressional purpose 
that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not 
subject to delay . . . .”). 
 314. Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal 
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 (1996). 
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freeing judicial resources for concentration on fewer cases.315  The time saving 
aspects and cost-effectiveness of arbitration cherished by parties and the legal 
community would evaporate with expanded judicial review of arbitration 
awards.316 
Besides ruining arbitration’s advantage over litigation in costs and time, 
expanded judicial review would also compromise the integrity of the 
arbitration system by taking away traditional advantages of arbitration: parties 
choosing an expert as arbitrator, the awarding of alternative remedies that 
courts cannot usually grant, and the lack of a need for a written opinion or 
discovery.  The Bowen court stated: “Arbitrators are chosen for their 
specialized experience and knowledge, which enable them to fashion creative 
remedies and solutions that courts may be less likely to endorse.”317  If 
arbitration was subject to expanded judicial review for errors of law or fact, the 
arbitrator would most likely have to be a lawyer (which is not always the case) 
because the district court reviewing the award would certainly need an 
extensive record to make a fair and informed adjudication.  Therefore, the 
arbitrator and parties would have to make sure that an extensive record exists, 
which could only be accomplished through discovery, and a written and 
reasoned award granted.  These requirements would add cost and, more 
importantly, would blur the line between arbitration and litigation.  Also, and 
more significantly, “arbitrators faced with heightened judicial scrutiny might 
ultimately come to focus less on the merits of the particular dispute, or the 
relationship between the parties, and more on the task of producing opinions or 
building a record that would enable their awards to survive later challenge.”318 
One of the main disadvantages of litigation is that it sometimes fails to 
render a decision within the standards of the business involved; therefore, 
resolution by a party with expertise in the area of dispute “is one of the greatest 
advantages of arbitration.”319  In addition, an arbitrator chosen for his 
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knowledge and experience in the area “will know more about the disputed 
subject than ordinary judges or juries” thereby giving parties more confidence 
in the award handed down.320 As stated above, if an arbitrator has to worry 
about ensuring that her award will not be overturned by spending more time 
preserving a record or refereeing discovery, then her focus will be shifted away 
from the task she has to complete—coming to a just and efficient resolution of 
the dispute. 
The flexibility of arbitration allows an arbitrator to come up with a more 
equitable solution to the dispute.321  Instead of “promoting enlightened 
development of the law” through arbitration’s specially crafted solutions, 
expanded judicial review would deter arbitrators from crafting “reasonable 
solutions if they had to worry that courts might not be willing or able to 
endorse the legal bases on which they rest.”322 
The expanded standard of judicial review is also unsettling due to the fact 
that a court may be asked to review an award without a complete record or 
arbitrator opinion, which could put the court in the untenable position of 
appearing to be an “unprincipled decisionmaker” and damaging its integrity.323  
An extensive record could solve this with an opinion fueled by discovery, but 
again cost considerations would arise thereby making arbitration a less 
attractive form of dispute resolution. 
Traditionally, except in labor and international arbitrations, arbitrators 
rarely issue opinions, but render awards that may just state who won and what 
remedies were granted to the prevailing party.324  Furthermore, arbitrators are 
not required to explain the reasoning behind their awards.325  Stare decisis or 
precedent does not apply to arbitrators without party agreement, so arbitrators 
can inject their own notions of justice as long as this does not result in a party 
 
 320. Kanowitz, supra note 315, at 255. 
 321. DOMKE, supra note 294, at 11. 
 322. Smit, supra note 277, at 152. 
 323. Cole, supra note 29, at 1259. 
 324. Marc S. Dobin, Appealing the Unappealable: Vacating Arbitration Awards, THE BRIEF, 
Fall 1996, at 69.  For examples of what forms arbitration awards can take, see JAY E. GRENIG, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FORMS 461-63 (2d ed. 1996).  But see Josef Rohlik, 
Arbitrators Should Write Opinions for Parties and for Courts, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 933, 940 
(2000), for examples of how the absence of an arbitrator opinion can result in vacatur of awards. 
 325. See, e.g., Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(“[A]n arbitrator is simply not required to state the reasons for his decision . . . Such a 
requirement would serve only to perpetuate the delay and expense which arbitration is meant to 
combat.”); In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1214  (2d Cir. 1972) (“Obviously, a requirement that 
arbitrators explain their reasoning in every case would help to uncover egregious failures to apply 
the law to an arbitrated dispute.  But such a rule would undermine the very purpose of arbitration, 
which is to provide a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute 
settlement.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
554 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:509 
being treated unfairly.326  One of the pitfalls of litigation that leads to it 
becoming expensive is that parties take great pains to secure a complete record 
for any appeal that could follow.327  Therefore, parties in an arbitration with 
expanded judicial review will do the same thing, leading to additional costs 
like a stenographer, written opinion (arbitrators charge by the hour sometimes), 
or lawyers obsessing over technicalities resulting in the arbitration becoming 
nothing more than a step in the ladder of litigation. 
Courts recognize that a major distinction between litigation and arbitration 
is that the latter does not require discovery and reject arbitral discovery 
because it “is generally regarded as inconsistent with arbitration’s goal of 
speed, efficiency and reduced cost.”328  With the requirement of a complete 
record for judicial review, heightened discovery would be required in the 
arbitration process.  Delay and inefficiency could arise in arbitration because 
many arbitrators are not lawyers and do not have the legal training essential to 
conduct the complicated process of discovery.329 
The greatest danger is that enforcing parties’ agreements that expand 
judicial review of arbitration will hurt the integrity of the process by making 
arbitration just another rung in the ladder of federal court adjudication.  
Arbitration is an act of self-governance by which the parties choose their own 
judge, set their own rules and avoid the trappings of litigation like costs and 
delay by keeping the government out of their dispute.330  Expanded review 
would bring the courts back into the process beyond the limited functions they 
perform under the FAA and cause a “flood of appeals” tossing arbitration “into 
a litigation-like quagmire.”331  Adhering to the limited review in the FAA 
keeps the integrity of arbitration intact for two reasons: first, expanded judicial 
review would lead to arbitration becoming “a mere-stepping stone to 
litigation”332 and, second, a process allowing a “‘second bite at the apple’ 
would do little to establish the faith and confidence that any system of dispute 
resolution requires.”333  Allowing expanded review for errors of fact or law 
would transform arbitration into “a preliminary step to litigation, a mere 
advisory process, or simply a private trial court whose awards will be reviewed 
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by an appellate [judge].”334  Allowing arbitration to become just a step towards 
litigation cannot be what Congress or the Supreme Court intended by giving 
parties the opportunity, through their agreement, to mold their own procedures 
for dispute resolution. 
B. Parties Cannot Alter the Judicial Process 
The Supreme Court has stated that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at 
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”335  Enforcing 
an agreement expanding judicial review is not sanctioned by the FAA and 
could initiate a resurrection of the judiciary’s “historical anti-arbitration 
sentiment. . . .”336  In addition, the FAA was meant to guarantee the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements just like other contracts, but it would be 
incredulous to think that Congress intended that arbitration agreements could 
direct a court how to conduct itself.  There is no precedent of the Supreme 
Court that can be cited to support the proposition that parties may contractually 
dictate to courts how they must decide disputes.  The Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the FAA give parties free range on formation of arbitration 
agreements,337 but mention nothing about contracting as to how a federal court 
must review the arbitration award.  As Judge Mayer so aptly put it in his 
LaPine dissent: “Kyocera cites no authority explicitly empowering litigants to 
dictate how an Article III court must review an arbitration decision.  Absent 
this, they may not.”338 
The Supreme Court has given great deference to what parties contract for 
beyond the cases examined in Part III of this Comment.  In M/S Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Court held that the parties’ forum selection clause 
choosing the High Court in London as the forum for the dispute should be 
honored and that the claim that enforcing the clause would “oust” the federal 
courts of jurisdiction was a legal fiction.339  Similarly, in Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Court upheld a forum selection clause against a party 
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claim that the forum was inconvenient and unfair.340  Nevertheless, both of 
these cases involve a federal court divesting itself of the case in deference to 
the parties’ agreements while the expanded judicial review would require a 
federal court to enter judgment on a matter it could not have ruled on absent 
the agreement.  Thus, courts allowing parties to contract for expanded review 
of awards would mean one of two things: that the parties have the power to 
dictate how the judiciary operates or that the court can be utilized by parties as 
a kind of super-arbitrator. 
There is no doubt that parties possess the freedom to sculpt their arbitration 
process as they see fit.  Yet the key word is “process,” meaning the parties 
decide how the procedure of their arbitration is run.  Contracting for expanded 
review involves the parties attempting to dictate how the judicial process must 
be run.  As the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated: “Section 10 [of 
the FAA] sets forth a restricted list of grounds on which a court may entertain a 
motion to vacate an award; those grounds are directed primarily to 
fundamental errors within the arbitration process itself (for instance, fraud, 
misconduct) . . . .”341  Parties may direct the procedure of the arbitration, but 
cannot contract for how a court decides the substantive issue of whether 
vacatur is appropriate. 
Professor Alan Scott Rau “see[s] the provisions of § 10 [of the Act], not as 
an imperative command of public policy, but as no more than a set of ‘default 
rules’ intended to reflect the traditional historical understanding concerning the 
binding effect of arbitral awards.”342  However, there is no language in the 
FAA indicating that its provisions are “default rules,” that parties may 
supplement the sections of the Act by contract, or that parties are free to ignore 
the grounds for vacatur set forth in section 10 if they please to do so. 
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution states: “The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”343  Article 
I gives Congress the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court.”344  Article III, Section 2 provides a list of federal court subject matter 
jurisdiction.345  Professor John Leubsdorf wrote: “The article III courts . . . 
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limit the powers of Congress and the President by construing statutes and 
judging the constitutionality of legislative and executive action.”346  Courts 
following the directives of parties in reviewing awards would, in fact, be 
misconstruing the FAA without declaring it unconstitutional. 
Nowhere in the Constitution did the framers say private parties could 
create jurisdiction or dictate judicial power.  In American Fire & Casualty Co. 
v. Finn, the Supreme Court stated: “The jurisdiction of the federal courts is 
carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or by prior action 
or consent of the parties.”347  In Community Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor, the Supreme Court elaborated this point by stating that “the parties by 
consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the 
limitations imposed by Article III . . . When these Article III limitations are at 
issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the 
limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to 
protect.”348  Courts and parties adopting the party-driven expansion of review 
of awards would be in conflict with the Supreme Court because the courts 
would be deciding cases that they would not normally have the power to 
decide. 
However, the FAA is not a jurisdictional statute and an independent 
ground for jurisdiction must be present for parties to take advantage of the 
FAA.  Judge Posner, in Chicago Typographical, stated: “federal jurisdiction 
cannot be created by contract.”349  The LaPine court attempted to refute this 
statement by claiming “that the FAA is a regulation of commerce rather than a 
limitation on or conferral of federal court jurisdiction.”350  Beyond the fact that 
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA appear to be a limitation on the judiciary’s 
power to vacate or modify an arbitration award, the question must be asked as 
to how can Congress effectuate its power to regulate commerce?  The simple 
answer is by giving courts jurisdiction to enforce the policies of its legislation.  
When parties begin to impose their own standards on the courts, they are 
usurping the power granted exclusively to Congress, even more so when 
Congress has already definitively spoken on the subject as it has concerning 
arbitration. 
One scholar went as far as to state that if courts did enforce parties’ 
agreements to expand judicial review beyond the FAA, the court would be 
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ignoring Congress and violating the separation of powers doctrine.351  To allow 
this would be a dangerous precedent, indeed.  The Supreme Court has stated: 
“Some [problems] will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by 
looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will 
effectuate that policy.  The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined 
by the nature of the problem.”352  No inventiveness is needed for the problem 
of vacating arbitration awards since there already is an express Congressional 
directive which controls—the FAA. 
While not as onerous as the above constitutional implications, a court 
acting as a super-arbitrator is not permissible.  Under expanded review, courts 
would be acting as the parties’ arbitrator of last resort because, if the parties’ 
agreements must be followed exactly according to their terms, the court should 
have to conduct its review under any rules or laws that the parties had agreed 
upon.  This would put the court into “the awkward position of reviewing 
proceedings conducted under potentially unfamiliar rules and procedures.”353  
The court is not required to denigrate itself in this manner by blurring the 
distinct lines between arbitration and adjudication.  At least one Circuit Court 
of Appeals has ruled that any federal judge or magistrate may not act as an 
arbitrator.  In what Judge Posner described as a “procedurally remarkable 
case,” the parties in DDI Seamless Cylinder v. General Fire Extinguisher 
Corp. asked a federal magistrate who was assigned their case to act as 
arbitrator for them and he agreed to fill that role.354  To avoid having to subject 
the magistrate judge’s decision under the strict review of the FAA and thus 
avoid the discomfort of one judge confirming or vacating the award of another, 
the court characterized the situation as a case of the magistrate and parties 
agreeing to a shortened procedure “rather than an unauthorized arbitral one.”355 
When parties contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards, 
they are, in effect, asking the federal district court to act as a super-arbitrator, 
not a judge.  Only when parties petition for confirmation, vacatur, or 
modification are they seeking an order permitted by federal law.  By agreeing 
to review the award under the standard of expanded review, the judge has 
taken off his “judge’s hat” and put on his “arbitrator’s hat”356 since there is no 
statutory basis allowing the judge to review the cases in the manner dictated by 
the parties. 
 
 351. McCartney, supra note 145, at 162.  See also Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 114, at 248 
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 353. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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One last argument not addressed by the courts against permitting expanded 
judicial review of arbitration awards is that arbitration with this new standard 
for vacatur would no longer be arbitration at all.  An arbitration clause, in 
effect, ousts the court of its jurisdiction357  and allows the arbitrator to resolve 
the dispute independently.  An arbitration agreement expanding judicial review 
beyond the grounds set forth in section 10 of the FAA would not oust the court 
of its jurisdiction, but would permit the dispute to get into court through the 
back door.  Therefore, it can be argued that a clause expanding review would 
be unenforceable as a result.  A court could easily invalidate the entire 
arbitration agreement, or the expanding clause, because the agreement would 
be self-contradictory.  On one hand, contracting for dispute resolution through 
arbitration and, on the other hand, ultimately calling upon the court system to 
give the final word on the resolution of the dispute. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment does not refute that arbitration is a process operated 
pursuant to the wishes or whims of the parties who contracted for arbitration.  
Parties are free to contract as to what law will govern their arbitration, who 
will hear their controversy, where the arbitration will be held, and the list goes 
on and on.  Yet a court reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to expanded 
judicial review created by the parties goes against the precise word of 
Congress as laid down in the FAA.  Once a decision is made and a party 
wishes to have that award confirmed or vacated in federal court, to paraphrase 
President Harry S. Truman, the buck stops there.  The party is then invoking 
federal jurisdiction under the FAA and courts should be obliged to follow what 
Congress enacted, not what the parties contracted.  As the Supreme Court in 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon stated: “Like any statutory 
directive, the Arbitration Act mandate may be overridden by a contrary 
congressional command.”358  Through the FAA, Congress “codified judicial 
deference to the arbitration process . . . reflect[ing] congressional confidence in 
the arbitration process to make the right decision in the large majority of cases 
and to reduce the caseload in federal courts.”359  Furthermore, allowing 
expanded judicial review through freedom of contract principles is a 
reactionary exercise reviving the “judicial hostility towards arbitration that the 
FAA sought to remedy.”360 
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There are several alternatives to a flat out rejection of expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards.  First, Congress could follow the lead of states 
like New Jersey and amend section 10(a) of the Act to permit vacatur for errors 
of law or fact.361  Second, parties could follow Judge Posner’s advice in 
Chicago Typographical and “contract for an appellate arbitration panel to 
review the arbitrator’s award.”362  This would allow parties to avoid having to 
enter the federal court system, hence avoiding added costs and delay, and 
permit the parties to still control the scope of review and who would conduct 
the review.  Third, if parties are concerned with the possibility of an arbitrator 
applying the law incorrectly, they can make sure the arbitrators they select are 
competent, establish unambiguous criteria for how the arbitration shall be 
conducted, limit the damages or remedies that an arbitrator can award, and 
obligate the arbitrator to provide his reasoning for the award thereby avoiding 
the hazard that a court may not enforce an expanded review of the award.363 
Since expanded judicial review of awards would lead to an assault on the 
integrity and effectiveness of the arbitration process and because there is no 
basis for allowing parties to alter the federal court process by agreement, 
Bowen should be viewed as the correct approach in denying parties this 
awesome power, which they granted to themselves.  Allowing party-created, 
expanded judicial review would harm the integrity of the courts by forcing 
them to follow the directions of private citizens and making the clear line 
separating arbitration and litigation disappear leading to arbitration becoming 
just another step in the litigation process. 
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